Nightmare on Iwo Jima: A Marine in Combat

8. The Hill That Opened

Chapter 8 The Hill That Opened O n about D plus eight, after capturing the knoll north of Airfield No.2, we awaited further orders. I observed what might be our next objective , a hill to our front. While cautiously watching the enemy position, my mind pondered. Then, as in a dream, I thought I saw the side of the hill open like a door on its hinges and from its orifice come a large Japanese field piece being pushed on tracks by a crew of six or eight men. The field piece fired three rounds, which woke me out of my daze into the realization that perhaps this was not something I was imagining. As quickly as they fired the rounds, the Japanese pushed the big gun back into the hill. The opening closed and the Japanese and the field piece disappeared from sight. The whole thing had occurred so quickly I wasn't sure that I had seen it. Was it my imagination? I was ashamed to tell my noncommissioned officer , Sgt. James Henry, what had happened for fear he might think that I had succumbed to battle fatigue, but I did ask him to concentrate on that same area 62 MOVING ON without telling him what I had seen. I looked through my field glasses and patiently waited, and then it happened again. Sgt. Henry grabbed my arm and in a befuddled tone told me to look at the hill. There was no doubt about it. The two of us saw it. The big gun was pushed out, fired three more rounds to our right flank, and before we knew it, was pushed back into the side of the hill again. The doors were well camouflaged and blended in with the rest of the hill. We then realized why we were having such a difficult time locating the enemy's gun position. The enemy was so proficient at their task that the efficiency of the total operation was almost guaranteed. This, as well as the underground tunnels, proved that Japan's preparations for this island had been undertaken many years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Then I wondered, Why would the Japanese expose themselves when they knew that we were so close we would be able to see them? Why didn't they direct their fire on us instead of the ravine to our right? Both of these questions were soon answered: first, the gun emplacement was constructed to fire in just one direction along the ravine, which was the obvious approach to the hill. It was on tracks and in a fixed direction and could not rotate. Second, the Japanese were firing on I Company, which was coming to join us. I knew that Lt. Raymond Ickes, who was commanding I Company, was unaware of the location of the gun, nor could he get to it even if he did knOw. Our ammunition was almost depleted, and it was too much of a gamble for us to exchange fire with the enemy. We had no fortification that could offer resistance to a big gun. I didn't want to further expose my men after what they had been through. At that moment I would have given anything for a bazooka. I called headquarters and informed Colonel Boehm about the situation. He put his 81-mrn mortars at my disposal and put me in contact with the mortars crew. We waited for the side of the hill to open again. When it did, I gave the order for the mortars to fire, and phosphorous and explosive shells were dropped on the enemy emplacements. When our shelling stopped, the side of that hill had been opened for the last time. The crew had been killed and the gun was knocked out. Lieutenant Ickes's unit eventually joined us on our right. He told me he had selected that ravine because it appeared to be the best protection for his men. By this time it was two o'clock in the afternoon and we still hadn't received the relief that had been promised. I tried to call headquarters, but my wires were cut again and the battery I had picked up earlier had gone dead. I told Lt. Baker to take charge and again went back to headquarters. Colonel Boehm replenished our supply of ammo and combined part of another unit with mine, then...