Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation

3. The Geopolitical Production of Danger

35 The Geopolitical Production of Danger We’ll฀kill฀every฀son฀of฀a฀bitch฀north฀of฀the฀forward฀edge฀of฀the฀battle฀area,฀ and฀we฀won’t฀retreat฀one฀inch. —u.s.฀lieutena nt฀gener al฀james฀f.฀hollingsworth฀ at฀the฀dmz,฀1974 We’re฀a฀peaceful฀people.฀.฀.฀.฀Traveling฀south฀on฀that฀road,฀the฀people฀of฀ the฀North฀would฀see฀not฀a฀threat฀but฀a฀miracle฀of฀peaceful฀development. —u.s.฀president฀george฀w.฀bush฀at฀the฀dmz,฀2002 Constituting a natural link between the Asian mainland and Japan, the Korean peninsula has always been an important factor in the security policy of the surrounding powers. In the nineteenth century two major wars were fought for control of the peninsula, one between Japan and China (1894–1895) and the other between Japan and Russia (1904–1905). With the development of military technology and the increased globalization of the confrontation among the great powers in the twentieth century, the geopolitical importance of Korea increased. The arbitrary partition of Korea in 1945, and the subsequent transformation of this supposedly provisional settlement into a permanent division of the peninsula, must be attributed largely to the strategic and symbolic importance of Korea in the emerging Cold War power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Initially, the competition was largely a rivalry between these two hegemons, but the struggle for influence in Korea did not 3 36฀ ฀ ·฀ ฀ the฀geopolitical฀production฀of฀danger remain a Soviet-American affair. With the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s and the reemergence of Japan as an economic power, the situation in Korea became directly linked to the security and economic interests of the four great powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. Acknowledging the importance of geopolitical factors is not as obvious as it seems at first sight. Many studies of Korean politics and society, especially those conducted under the broad influence of the modernization paradigm, paid relatively little attention to geopolitical issues. Consider, for instance, how Gregory Henderson, in one of the most influential early texts on Korean politics, argues that “external factors are for Korea and her internal courses of secondary importance. If this judgment is wrong, I stand most ready to have it proven so.”1 By scrutinizing the geopolitical context of Korea’s security dilemmas , I bring the earlier discussions of individual and national identity back to the locus classicus of security studies, to its object and subject: the state.2 States have identities just as individual people do. They struggle with a variety of internal dilemmas, which are then projected onto the outside world. Military doctrine, for instance, is just as much about the allocation of power within society as it is about warding off an external threat. This is why Elizabeth Kier believes that it is “counterintuitive to assume that military doctrines respond only to objective conditions in the international arena.”3 Now I would like to examine how Korea’s security dilemmas became intertwined with Cold War international relations and how the ensuing identity constructs continue to shape politics on and toward the peninsula long after the collapse of the Soviet Union. I will give special attention to the two nuclear crises that have haunted the Korean peninsula since the early 1990s. In each case, in 1993–1994 and in 2002–2003, the events were strikingly similar: North Korea made public its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons and withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Then the situation rapidly deteriorated until the peninsula was literally at the brink of war. The dangers of North Korea’s actions, often interpreted as nuclear brinkmanship, are evident and much discussed but not so some of the interactive dynamics that have led to the standoff in the first place. In this chapter I seek to shed light on at least some of them. I will pay particular attention the role of the United States, for nothing about the past and present dilemmas on the peninsula can the฀geopolitical฀production฀of฀danger฀ ฀ ·฀ ฀ 37 be addressed or even understood without recourse to the United States. This is why China repeatedly stressed that the latest nuclear crisis was primarily an issue between North Korea and the United States.4 Kim Dae-jung, in his final speech as South Korea’s president , reiterated the same theme: “more than anything, dialogue between North Korea and the United States is the important key to...