Free Burma: Transnational Legal Action and Corporate Accountability

Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here?

196 I have argued that, contrary to the perspective of most scholars, the pro-democracy movement in Burma did not start down a path of inevitable decline after 1990. Instead, it reincarnated itself as the Free Burma movement through its transnational legal action. After nearly fifteen years, the movement is alive and well. Nevertheless, predicting the future of democracy in Burma is difficult . Democracy in Burma will likely not come on the back of a social movement alone. More powerful states in the international community (e.g., China and the United States) will certainly play a role in determining Burma’s political course. As I argued in chapter 1, this has been the case since Burma’s independence and, along with the member states of ASEAN, this continues to be the case. While the pariah status of the Myanmar military throughout the international community is well deserved, the ritualized discourse among the international community emphasizing it masks an important truth about the possibilities for democratic change in Burma. It leads us to believe that the most powerful states in the international community would like to see the Myanmar military replaced or reformed by democratic leadership. Yet this book documents how the United States and many of its partners in the international community lack the political will to exercise the kind of demoConclusion Where Do We Go from Here? Conclusion 197 cratic influence that could contribute to such reform. In the short term, this does not bode well for the future of democracy in Burma. As we saw in chapter 3, federal sanctions against Burma, enacted in 1997, allowed Unocal Oil Company to continue with its construction of the Yadana gas pipeline (now owned by Chevron). It represented a shift away from existing, effective, local sanctions with real teeth to a policy that blended sanctions with “constructive engagement.” After the 2007 Saffron Revolution, President George W. Bush and the U.S. Congress implemented several tougher, “smart sanctions” that targeted the Burmese generals’ assets and bank accounts, as well as the importation of key “conflict” gems, like jade and rubies. So, taken together, the U.S. sanctions policy has not been consistent and at times has included some economic engagement. It is this particular mix of carrots and sticks that represents the failed U.S. policy toward Burma, not, as Virginia senator Jim Webb (and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) argued throughout 2009, sanctions in general. Despite the differences between policies of constructive engagement and economic sanctions, what both proclaim to share is the goal of promoting tripartite dialogue among Burma’s generals, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy Party, and leaders of the ethnic and nationalist minority groups. However, these policies, as practiced, have never really come close to achieving this goal. President Barack Obama’s new policy of “direct engagement,” which his administration began pursuing in October 2009, attempts to rethink and recalibrate the balance of carrots and sticks that it might use to promote such tripartite dialogue. “Direct,” as opposed to “constructive,” engagement is meant to emphasize first and foremost diplomacy and dialogue with Burma’s ruling regime, rather than the formation of business ventures with them. What form has this direct engagement taken so far in the run-up to the scheduled 2010 elections in Myanmar? President Obama’s meeting with Burmese prime minister Thein Sein at the U.S.–ASEAN Summit in November 2009 was meant to signal that the United States is completely committed to direct political engagement with Myanmar’s military leaders . It was not merely a temporary gesture in a more instrumental effort to shore up U.S.–ASEAN trade relations. Despite General Than Shwe’s comments during the preceding week depicting the efforts of Secretary of State Clinton and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell as neocolonial interference in Myanmar’s af- 198 Conclusion fairs, it seems significant that he allowed his prime minister to meet with Obama afterward. As I am writing this in February 2010, the Obama administration seems poised to begin making some concessions, possibly including the easing of sanctions, if Than Shwe is able to orchestrate the “free and fair” elections that he claims are his intentions. For the Obama administration , “free and fair” means also “credible”; that is, elections that would include the participation of the winner of the previous democratic elections in 1990 whom...