Making School Reform Work: New Partnerships for Real Change

Chapter 3. New Capacity for Civic Oversight

17 THREE New Capacity for Civic Oversight paul t. hill large public school districts are “in” the community but only rarely are they “of” it. Their strength is also their weakness : somehow urban schools stand apart from the other major political and economic forces driving their cities. This independence, something that is supported by the tenure and civil-service status enjoyed by their employees, is intended to buffer them from partisan politics. Their bonding authority provides local educators with formidable local clout and autonomy in the face of the roller coaster of municipal finance. The independence of local school boards is thought to protect schools from what might be intolerable meddling from local politicians. On balance, there is a lot to justify this traditional deference to the autonomy of the local school system. Yet this isolation comes with significant costs. Schools, shielded from the hurly-burly of local politics, are often isolated from many important political currents running through the community. Has a major local employer shut the doors? That is a concern, but otherwise of little significance to a school board that has been planning a bond issue for a year or more. Districts are even insulated from the realities of competition for market share that drive so many other institutions. School districts can lose student population for years, but as long as the loss of students is no faster than the rate of teachers’ retirement, nobody in the district sees a serious problem. That is why school districts in Seattle and Dayton continued largely with business as usual during a thirty-year period when their student populations dropped by 50 percent or more. 18 paul t. hill Isolation from external pressures makes school districts highly attentive to their internal politics. Superintendents, central offices, teachers unions, and school boards presumably want to improve schools, but their disagreements lead to deadlock. District leaders might want schools to take the initiative in tailoring instruction to students’ needs, but they can not change use-of-time regulations, teacher-work rules, or strictures on the use of funds. Districts can try to improve their teaching forces by investing in in-service training, but they cannot weed out mediocre teachers or try hiring teachers with different qualifications.1 Nor can they with any regularity close failed schools or create alternatives for children who have been trapped in such schools. Effective reform strategies, strong and long lasting enough to transform the educational opportunities of thousands of children in big-city schools, are possible. But they do not come easily or without conflict. They require fundamental changes of three kinds. First, performance incentives—so that it matters a great deal to principals and teachers whether the children in their care learn. Next, investments in new capacity—so that schools can strengthen their faculties (through training and recruitment) and improve their methods and materials. Finally, schools need freedom of action, so that teachers and principals can use their expertise on behalf of students.2 Effective reform strategies generate opposition often leading to turnover in superintendents, school boards, and union leaders; they must be sustained even when leaders are replaced. In fact, a reform strategy that does not explicitly provide for leadership turnover amounts to little more than a false promise to the general public. Too often, particularly when school boards seek a new superintendent, the sense is that the district needs better leadership and, ideally, a leader with a plan. But in fact, what the community really should possess is a mission and strategy that new leaders inherit—not leaders with recycled ideas attractively decorated in new colors. Understanding the strategy, and support for its continuation, must be lodged somewhere more stable and longer lasting than any organ of the school district. Superintendents turn over frequently. So too do school boards. The teachers union is long lasting, but, as only one party with specific interests in school reform, it cannot be allowed to dominate policy. A Civic Leadership Group What is the alternative? If the cycle-time of board and superintendent turnover is shorter than the cycle of reform implementation, reform strategies will always be abandoned before they can bear fruit. Though boards new capacity for civic oversight 19 and superintendents can seize the agenda for a time, their inevitable departure means that other more stable entities, particularly the teachers union and permanent central office staff, are most likely to get what they want in...