In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

137 chapter seven “If we are run out of Vietnam, our entire foreign policy would be in jeopardy.” Henry Kissinger “We’re playing a Russian game, a Chinese game, and an election game.” Richard Nixon ONE WAY OR THE OTHER Getting Out, Finally China had always tantalized Richard Nixon, even before he became president . China, he knew, was more than an ancient civilization shrouded in mystery . It was, at the right time, a card to be played. In September 1970, Nixon hinted in an interview with Time that he would like to visit China one day. Mao Zedong picked up the hint and told journalist Edgar Snow in Life that he “would be happy to talk to him, either as a tourist or as president.” Henry Kissinger was skeptical but at the same time fascinated by the prospect of a China card. How exactly would it be played? White House chief of staff Bob Haldeman injected a time frame: “You know, he actually seriously intends to visit China before the end of his second term.” Kissinger replied: “Fat chance.”1 But in early 1971 Russia and China began to exchange more than angry rhetoric across their long, uneasy border—they started shooting at each other; and these skirmishes triggered tremors of excitement (and anxiety) at the White House. Kissinger wondered whether this might not be the time to push for an opening to China, which the United States had tried to isolate ever since the communist takeover in 1949. With Nixon’s strong support, he got busy playing his favorite, if to this point deferred, game of triangular diplomacy. Always in Kissinger’s mind was his firm belief that if the United States was to play the China card, the White House had to control all the diplomatic levers. He had no faith in the usual channels of diplomacy. The State Department , for example, ought to be kept “working away in ignorance” while he and Nixon made the key decisions. He feared leaks and distrusted loose-lipped 138 One Way or the Other: Getting Out, Finally diplomats, of which there were actually very few but he imagined numbered in the thousands. Congress? It was to be kept at arm’s length, if at all possible. Kissinger and Nixon looked to Pakistan as their perfect intermediary with China. It had the trappings of a democracy, but it was run by an authoritarian general named Yahya Khan, whom Nixon had befriended during an August 1969 journey around the world. The president confided to Khan that he was interested in a new relationship with China. Might Pakistan help? Khan answered, “of course,” but for more than a year nothing happened. In October 1970, during a White House visit, Khan informed Nixon that he was on his way to China. Did Nixon have a message he would like him to convey? Yes, indeed, Nixon responded: Would China entertain a proposal for a high-level American envoy to visit Peking? Khan delivered the message to Premier Zhou Enlai and got a quick written reply, which he carried back to Pakistan and gave to a secret courier to be delivered to the Pakistani ambassador in Washington. Six weeks later, on the evening of December 8, the ambassador handed the reply to Kissinger. “In order to discuss the subject of the vacation [sic] of Chinese territories called Taiwan,” Zhou wrote in awkward prose, “a special envoy of President Nixon’s will be most welcome in Peking.” Kissinger quickly drafted a response on plain Xerox paper, cleared it with Nixon, and handed it to the Pakistani ambassador. Though Zhou had narrowed the agenda to Taiwan, Kissinger broadened it. The American envoy would discuss “a broad range of issues,” including Taiwan. Then, with subtle delicacy, Kissinger linked Taiwan to the Vietnam War. “The policy of the United States government is to reduce its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific [read Taiwan] as tensions in this region [read Vietnam ] diminish,” he wrote. Zhou did not need a translation. Help us contain the war in Vietnam so we can manage an honorable exit from that country, Kissinger was saying, and the United States will reduce its military presence on Taiwan, which China needed for its policy of eventual reunification of the two Chinas. The groundwork was laid for a historic deal. In early April 1971, with the Lam Son 917 calamity behind them and with the prospect of an opening to China before them, Nixon and...

Share