Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy in a Changing World

Chapter Three: Military Force against Terrorism: Questions of Legitimacy, Dilemmas of Efficacy

chapter three Military Force against Terrorism: Questions of Legitimacy, Dilemmas of Efficacy Bruce W. Jentleson It is true that terrorism goes way back in history, “as far back as does human conflict itself,” as Caleb Carr has written.1 It also is true that much of the world had been suffering from terrorism for a long time before September 11.2 Still, the issue did change dramatically after the United States made it its top national security priority and the Bush administration decided on its particular “war on terrorism” approach, with its heavy emphasis on the use of military force. Among the many issues raised by terrorism, this chapter will focus primarily on two: the legitimacy and the efficacy of the use of military force.3 As a general matter, questions of norms and legitimacy have greater bearing in the current state of the world than during the cold war, when so much was driven by superpower dominance and competition. While international norms “do not determine action,” as Martha Finnemore aptly puts it, they do “create permissive conditions for action.”4 Being able to claim the rightness of action does not just affirm ideals, it also enhances efficacy. With regard to efficacy, as broadly stated by Gordon Craig and the late Alexander George, “The proposition that force and threats of force are at times a necessary instrument of diplomacy . . . is part of the conventional wisdom of statecraft.” History does show that efforts to deal with international conflicts “solely by means of rational persuasion and peaceful 40 MILITARY FORCE AGAINST TERRORISM 41 diplomacy do not always succeed.” Yet “one can also find in history many cases in which threats of force or the actual use of force were often not only ineffective but seriously aggravated disputes.”5 Based on the regional dialogues that were part of the Brookings Force and Legitimacy project, as well as the growing literature of policy analyses and related studies, five main points can be made.6 First, spurred in large part by the “September 11 effect,” there is a relatively greater degree of international consensus supporting the legitimacy of using force against terrorism than for other objectives—although this consensus is not a full one and has qualifiers and conditions. Second, this consensus on legitimacy is strongest with regard to clear Article 51 self-defense cases and in situations where force is retaliatory; it is weaker with regard to the preemptive use of force and weakest regarding application of force for regime change and other preventive objectives and when substantial civilian casualties are incurred. Third, military strategies for combating terrorism face formidable efficacy challenges. Some of these are matters of doctrine, tactics, and overall strategy stemming from the asymmetric nature of most warfare against terrorists. Other challenges arise due to the problems of sustaining the initial military victory, as demonstrated by events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia (2006–07); the weaknesses and partially diverging interests of local allies; and tensions between the respective requisites of legitimacy and efficacy. Fourth, the “Iraq effect” has severely undermined the September 11 effect and continues to do so. Fifth, as difficult as these issues have been so far, they are becoming even more so over time. Legitimacy of the Use of Force against Terrorism The primary basis for the degree of consensus that does exist internationally comes from the nature of the terrorist threat, which involves nonstate actors and extremist states, targets innocent civilians, has catastrophic potential through the use of weapons of mass destruction, and engenders the kind of pervasive fear that can threaten democracy and the very rudiments of civil society. In these respects terrorism’s own illegitimacy contributes to the legitimacy of using force against it. Another key factor is some sense of shared threat across the international community. Some countries did harbor an “it’s about time” sentiment , since they had been dealing with terrorism long before the United States finally made it a priority. However, at least in the immediate aftermath of September 11, the overriding calculation was that with the United States now in the ballgame, the prospects for dealing effectively with terrorism were much better. The U.S. attack on Afghanistan in response to September 11 had a strong claim to legitimacy. Few questioned the American contention of acting in self-defense in ways consistent with Article 51 of the UN Charter . The Taliban regime already was under censure and sanctions...