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52 An Inside View of Reconciliation maung zarni 3 Both historically and in the present, the defining characteristics of politics in Myanmar have been mass poverty in all its dimensions, a multiplicity of conflicts, domination of the weak by the strong, and resistance from below.1 Sixty years after her independence from Britain, Myanmar is the only country in Southeast Asia that remains engulfed in domestic conflicts , both armed and nonviolent. Despite numerous local and external efforts at mediation and direct political negotiations, neither positive peace nor lasting resolution of conflicts is in sight. First, a word about my personal perspective. I was born in Myanmar and spent the first twenty-five years of my life in an extended military family where a state-centric, Burmese nationalist view prevailed. I have spent the second half of my life in exile as a dissident and a student of Burmese affairs, and my earlier views have necessarily been challenged by my complete immersion in Aung San Suu Kyi–led opposition politics and first-hand experience working with ethnic minority resistance groups. My views on peacemaking in Myanmar have evolved as a result of both intensive professional training in peace negotiations and firsthand experience in seeking common ground with the other side.2 Patterns and Trends in Peacemaking Until 1989 the conflict in Burma was a three-way affair between the Socialist Party–controlled Burmese army, the armed Maoists, and a number of indigenous ethnic armed resistance groups. Within ninety days of Burma’s independence in 1948, an open struggle for state power between the communists and the socialists—with irreconcilable ideological visions and personal 03-0505-5 ch3.indd 52 8/30/10 6:10 PM An Inside View of Reconciliation 53 rivalries—gave birth to a civil war within the ethnically Burman elite. The battle raged on until both the socialist-controlled military regime and their nemesis, the Communist Party of Burma, collapsed—in July 1988 and April 1989, respectively. Armed opposition from most ethnic minorities of political significance also began early, hardly paused during the 1988–90 transition , and continues to this day, despite a patchwork of disparate and fragile ceasefire deals with the country’s military rulers. Three distinct historical approaches to peacemaking can be seen between 1948, when the civil war first broke out under a parliamentary government, and 1988–89, when the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) began pursuing ceasefire deals with various ethnic armed resistance groups. In the first, influential nationalist figures in the fields of culture, literature, and politics, all ideologically leaning toward the left, launched a Leftist Unity campaign in the 1950s to mediate the conflict between the Maoists and the socialists. The objective, which did not come to fruition, was a lasting peace between the two most powerful forces in the conflict. In the second approach, many Burmese politicians in U Nu’s parliamentary government sought to establish a temporary ceasefire with the Maoists rather than a lasting peace, to concentrate resources on the military campaign against the armed ethnic minorities that were demanding greater autonomy or outright secession. At one point, U Nu’s government was on the verge of total defeat at the hands of the Karen National Defense Organization, which controlled territory reaching the suburbs of the capital city of Rangoon. The nationalist elite’s rationale was twofold: keeping the Union of Burma intact was more important than Burman leadership conflicts and ideology; and as soon as the military threats posed by the Karen National Defense Organization were addressed effectively the communists and the socialists could resume their own intra-ethnic, ideological feud. Lasting peace did not seem to be an end in and of itself for either the Burman politicians on both sides or the armed units on both sides. In the third approach, peace meant only two things for the Tatmadaw leaders. One was acceptance by all opposition groups of the military’s prerogatives , including the historical entitlement—the self-perceived institutional right—of the Tatmadaw to configure the postcolonial state in line with its uncompromising vision of a unitary polity. The other was acceptance by all opposition groups of the military’s operational terms of peace. In short, the military saw peacemaking as enforcement of a set of rules dictated by a central state (in Myanmar) led by the military and subject to its dictates. Since the Tatmadaw was created almost seventy years ago, its self-image 03-0505-5 ch3.indd 53 8/30/10...

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