The Obama Administration and the Americas: Agenda for Change

Chapter 7: Responding to the Challenges in Haiti

At the beginning of April 2008, as a result of the sudden rise in food prices, Haiti was engulfed by social unrest. By the end of October the country had been ravaged by three hurricanes that left hundreds dead and the city of Gonaïves completely covered by water and mud. The food crisis increased the suffering of the more than 6 million people who subsist on only two dollars a day, and the natural disasters once again pounded the morale of what are undoubtedly the people with the most tragic history in the Western Hemisphere. It is indeed unfortunate that the Caribbean nation has been hit by this series of catastrophes just when it was showing, for the first time in years, a reasonable degree of political cooperation between the main parties and the government; modest economic growth of 4.3 percent; a relatively better level of security as a result of the dismantling of gangs by UN peacekeepers and the local police; and above all, a cautious confidence within the elites and among international observers that the reforms the government was introducing to strengthen the rule of law would be implemented at last. This welcome progress does not mean that President René Préval has managed to alter in any significant way the enormous precariousness of the Haitian state structure. Haiti continues to have very feeble institutions that do not possess the means and the resources necessary to organize and control the nation’s territory. Its justice system is weak, dysfunctional, and often corrupt ; and its police force is understaffed and underequipped. The country has a dangerously overcrowded prison system in which 90 percent of inmates 109 seven Responding to the Challenges in Haiti Juan Gabriel Valdés have never been brought to trial. Haiti lacks social services: 70 percent of the population has no access to running water and lives on less than two dollars a day. Haitian society is threatened by drug trafficking and the criminal organizations that are sustained by it. But President Préval has recognized the need to fight corruption and impunity. He introduced comprehensive judicial reforms, and three laws have already been approved by the Haitian Parliament and after being promulgated in December 2007 are now going through a phase of implementation. The government has also created a commission to reduce the arbitrariness of pretrial detentions. In a speech last January, the president declared the fight against corruption, drug trafficking, and impunity to be his first priority. Since then, several police officers involved in drug trafficking have been arrested, and some prominent businessmen have been convicted for banking fraud and tax evasion. At the same time, with the support of the United Nations mission the electoral calendar has been properly followed. New electoral authorities were appointed and municipal elections took place in conditions of complete normalcy . In July 2007 Préval approved a program for the reform of the state judiciary, along with a vision for the reform of the administration and the decentralization of the country. Yet the fragility of the institutional and economic situation continues to harm the possibility of a permanent stabilization of the country. The implementation of a reform of the judiciary remains a critical factor. “The dysfunctional state of Haiti’s justice system has impeded the implementation of democratic reforms since the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship,” writes the International Crisis Group, correctly underlining what has been the main institutional factor in state failure in Haiti.1 The ICG lists the characteristics of the current order of things in the judiciary as incompetence, poor case management, no criminal records, prolonged pretrial detentions, inadequate pay for judges, inadequate infrastructure and logistical support, lack of judicial independence, antiquated codes, and lack of defense counsels. The Lessons Learned Since 1993 the international community has promoted multiple programs of support to the Haitian judiciary and the police. By 2001 various governments , including France and Canada, and agencies, most prominently, the American Administration of Justice Program, had invested around $110 mil110 Juan Gabriel Valdés lion in training and mentoring of the Haitian courts and in the reform of the police. In October 2000, however, the U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded “that millions of dollars had produced little or no progress in the justice and security sectors due to almost total lack of will in the Haitian government .” It recommended the termination of the program and...