Difficult Transitions: Foreign Policy Troubles at the Outset of Presidential Power

4. Campaign Trials

4 41 Of all the problems that have plagued the early months of new presidencies, perhaps none are more persistent or potentially more dangerous than those that arise from commitments made or implied during the presidential campaign. From Eisenhower’s campaign pledge to roll back Soviet gains in Eastern Europe through Clinton’s promise to lift the ban on gays in the military and George W. Bush’s denunciation of nation building, campaign rhetoric regularly comes back to complicate the lives of new administrations . Often the consequence of ill-considered promises is limited mainly to political embarrassment and loss of domestic political capital for a new administration that must squirm uncomfortably to explain why policy choices that seemed so compelling on the campaign trail look so different in the cold light of governing. But on occasion these commitments have caused serious harm to a new president’s policy agenda and have had a direct impact on important national security interests. In his memoir, Henry Kissinger eloquently summarized the fundamental problem, cautioning that even through the formal transition period, “the pledges of each new Administration are like leaves on a turbulent sea. No President-elect or his advisers can possibly know upon what shore they may finally be washed by that storm of deadlines, campaign trials ambiguous information, complex choices, and manifold pressures which descends upon all leaders of a great nation.”1 Despite this and similar cautions, and a long history of promises and pronouncements gone awry, the problem remains endemic. As Mosher and his colleagues observed in their landmark 1987 study of presidential transitions and foreign affairs: In the enthusiasm of political campaigning, candidates for the presidency commonly promise things that are simply beyond the realm of possibility or would have unhappy effects or seem silly if honest efforts were exerted to carry them out. These situations often develop simply through lack of knowledge of the relevant facts, lack of understanding of the full ramifications of an issue, or partisan disparagement of the achievements of the predecessor administration.2 This should hardly be surprising. While all serious candidates are motivated to seek the presidency because they believe they can best govern the nation, they know that they will only have that opportunity if they can get elected. And all of them are confronted with a core dilemma: strategies conducive to getting elected may be inconsistent with wise policymaking once in office. Dean Rusk, secretary of state under Kennedy and Johnson, once dismissed the significance of campaign promises. As he put it: “I’ve never heard anybody say, ‘let’s get out the party platform and see what it has to say about this.’ These are quadrennial wonders and that’s the end of it as far as policy is concerned.”3 It’s questionable whether this cavalier dismissal of campaign rhetoric was justified even in Rusk’s time. But today, when the 24/7 news cycle means every word spoken by a candidate is recorded for posterity and is often available in searchable form on the Internet, candidates are more inextricably tied to their promises than ever before. Moreover, as the American presidential election cycle gets longer, candidates are giving more speeches and making more promises. “Campaign promise creep” has become an increasingly important factor in the policymaking of new administrations. It is easier than ever to “catch” a politician who has not followed through on a campaign promise or a public pledge.4 42 campaign trials The pressure to implement campaign pledges can introduce a harrowing set of constraints that confounds a new administration during its early days in office. The promises and slogans of the campaign can bind the hands of a new administration—its “thrust and tone” are based in many ways on the campaign.5 A new president enters office fresh from the campaign trail, possessed by the sentiment, “We said this, so we have to do it.” And his staff and advisers, often drawn from the campaign team, share this sense of personal commitment. But however strong and central the campaign commitment, the incoming administration faces two, often inter-related problems. As experienced observer and practitioner David Gergen has observed, “Campaign promises often do not stand up well when they collide with reality.” In addition, the new administration has to decide how much political capital it is prepared to expend to achieve its campaign promises —and at...