Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon

Postwar Elite Interaction

23 Postwar Elite Interaction The period following the Lebanese civil war saw not only a new formula of power sharing, as exemplified in the Ta’if Agreement, but also the emergence of a new political elite composed of Syrian-supported politicians. The Ta’if Agreement was first and foremost an arrangement among elite groups. Although Arend Lijphart’s theories of consociational democracy can be used to explain this political system and the formal structures of its government, it is of limited use in understanding the complex interactions of the actors in the system. In this chapter I will supplement Lijphart’s perspective with an additional concept central to modern elite theory: the notion of elite settlements. American sociologists Michael Burton and John Higley define settlements as “relatively rare events in which warring national elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises.”1 The implementation of elite settlements can initially occur without the inclusion of all players. Using this perspective, it is possible to describe the interaction among the different actors in the Lebanese political system as progressing in three stages between 1989 and 2005. First, there was the initial elite pact of the Ta’if Agreement, in which a central group of elite factions negotiated their differences, while many other factions remained excluded. The second stage involved the progressive incorporation of other groups into the political process and their acceptance of the “rules of the game” under Syrian hegemony. Finally, in the third stage Lebanon saw a realignment of members of previously excluded groups and their co-option by other political forces, a process I call “factionalization .” Overall, the political system in post-Ta’if Lebanon was characterized by the consolidation of power by elites who had emerged in the 24  Pax Syriana 1990s and the marginalization of dissidents who sought to change the structure of the political regime.2 The Ta’if Agreement: An Elite Settlement Two sets of circumstances encourage the creation of elite settlements.3 The first is the existence of a conflict wherein all factions incur substantial losses. The protracted Lebanese civil war corresponds to this condition . The second is the occurrence of crises that threaten to bring about a resurgence of violence. Such crises are typically centered on heads of state whose errors of judgment, abuses of power, or personal weaknesses become public after a particular event. Such incidents threaten to exacerbate the discontent of the elite and to push disagreements to a point of no return. In this section, I show how the Ta’if Agreement grew out of such circumstances and how the provisions of the agreement were constructed. The 1988 Presidential Crisis and the War of Liberation In 1988 the last president of the First Lebanese Republic, Amin Gemayel, attempted to prolong his presidential term for an additional two years. Assuming that the French would support his actions, he blocked the upcoming presidential elections.4 On September 22, 1988, the night before the end of his term, Gemayel appointed the Lebanese Army commander General Michel Aoun as the head of an interim military government, and the position of president remained unfilled. This appointment marked the beginning of one of the most turbulent periods of contemporary Lebanese history.5 The military government appointed by Gemayel was equally divided between Christian and Muslim officers. However, the Muslim officers immediately resigned in order to support the legitimacy of the cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss. This action led to a period when Lebanon was ruled by two separate governments: the government of Michel Aoun, which portrayed itself as “constitutional,” and the government of Salim al-Hoss, which argued Postwar Elite Interaction  25 that it had the greater mandate under the National Pact. Al-Hoss’s cabinet was in fact the last government confirmed by parliament, and with the resignation of the Muslim officers, Aoun’s government did not include any form of Muslim representation. Aoun’s military government, which lasted from September 22, 1988, to March 14, 1989, was characterized by a monopoly on decision making . This monopolization was especially manifested in Aoun’s decision to begin a “war of liberation”—a decision that was made unilaterally and without counsel from other military officers.6 Aoun had been nominated to power at a crucial point in the history of the region. Iraq had just ended its long war with Iran and was getting ready to settle accounts with...