Back Channel Negotiation: Secrecy in the Middle East Peace Process

7. Back Channel Negotiation: Causes and Consequences

261 7 Back Channel Negotiation Causes and Consequences We never did anything to prepare public opinion [for peace]. —Dennis Ross1 This chapter synthesizes findings from a decade of research into the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations whose origins lie in the late 1980s and extends the analysis of the phenomenon of back channel negotiation.2 I set out to ascertain why back channel negotiations are used, what other negotiation variables they interact with, and what overall effect they can have on one of the most complex kinds of negotiations: an international peace process.3 In this chapter, back channel negotiation (BCN) is put into context as a category of negotiation behavior , a process choice with implications for the outcome of negotiations. Based on the historical analyses of the prior chapters and selected observations from other historical instances of BCN, I offer some conclusions that are hopefully useful for two audiences: scholars interested in the analysis of negotiation; and actual negotiators of interpersonal, organizational, domestic, or international conflicts. As defined earlier in this book, back channel negotiations are negotiations conducted in secret between the parties to a dispute. The negotiators may be “official ” or they may be a mixed group of official and nonofficial, a quasi–Track II effort characterized by secrecy. These negotiations may also operate in parallel with—or replace—acknowledged “front” channels of negotiation; they can be described as the “black markets” of negotiation, providing separate negotiation spaces where bargaining takes place in the shadows. When front channel negotiations fail they are sometimes eclipsed by successful back channel negotiations even though the same principals, conflicts, and sociopolitical contexts are involved. 262 Back Channel Negotiation This chapter offers answers to the questions that I posed at the beginning of the book: Why do decision makers deploy back channels and how do they function? What is the impact of BCN on international peace processes? The Palestinian-Israeli peace process, in which both back and front channels have consistently been used, provides the basis for comparing channels and offering tentative answers to these questions. Although BCN can facilitate breakthrough agreements, BCN can also damage peace process negotiations by exacerbating some of the difficult conditions and challenges that characterize them. In this chapter, I seek to extend our general knowledge of international negotiation and contribute to its theory and practice by exploring causes and consequences of back channels, and by synthesizing what we know from the dynamics of the Palestinian -Israeli peace process. In the second section of this chapter, I explain why leaders decide to use back channels to negotiate. Considerable attention is paid to the consequences of long-term reliance on secrecy. In the third section, I discuss some specific outcomes of the reliance on secrecy in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. In the fourth section, I present five hypotheses testable in other negotiation cases, both domestic and international. In the final sections, I explore the implications for negotiating peace processes. A Missing Variable in the Study of Peace Processes Throughout the years of the formal Palestinian-Israeli peace process that officially began in 1991 at the Madrid Peace Conference, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel made slow progress toward peaceful coexistence while negotiating the terms that would lead to the establishment of the state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza, the so-called two-state solution that, it was hoped, would resolve the core Middle East conflict. Hopes were high until the mid-1990s and even the late 1990s, and optimistic analyses prevailed among academics and practitioners. Some claimed that their own Track II work had contributed to the success of the peace process.4 Given the return to armed conflict and the hardening of the Israeli occupation, it seems that such hopes and claims may have been at the very least premature. Many factors have contributed to the impasse of the peace process but the process of the negotiations themselves has received less scrutiny than it merits. Back Channel Negotiation 263 Exceptions to the lack of analytical scrutiny include articles by Palestinian and Israeli negotiators such as Omar Dajani, who served as senior legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team.5 Many examinations of the peace process have consisted of autobiographical memoirs that tell an insider’s story but also apportion blame and take credit at the expense of analysis.6 As has been made evident throughout this text, one of the unusual characteristics of Palestinian...