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7 PUBLIC CHOIC E VERSUS DEMOCRAC Y RUSSELL HARDI N Public-choice theor y offer s tw o mai n classe s o f findings. First , aggregation fro m individua l t o collectiv e preference s ma y no t be well defined. Eve n thoug h ever y individua l ma y hav e a clear preference rankin g o f al l alternatives befor e us , we ma y no t b e able t o conver t thes e individua l ranking s int o a collective rank ing . Second , individua l motive s fo r actio n ma y no t fit collectiv e preferences fo r outcome s even when th e latter are well defined . We may all agree, for example , that we would al l be better of f i f we woul d al l pa y extr a fo r bette r pollutio n contro l equipmen t on ou r cars , bu t n o individua l ha s a n interes t i n makin g th e extra expenditure . No t onl y ar e w e damne d i f w e don' t agre e on wha t t o do, we may also be damned i f we do. The first clas s of findings cast s doubt on the conceptual coher ence o f majoritaria n democracy . Th e secon d clas s ha s com monly bee n though t t o yiel d a consensua l justification fo r th e coercive powe r o f th e stat e if , o f course, the stat e i s democratic. Just becaus e our individua l motivation s work agains t our collec tive interests, we should choos e t o coerce ourselves to act in ou r This pape r ha s benefite d fro m critica l commentarie s b y Joh n W . Chapman , Thomas Christiano , Rober t E . Lane, and Ala n Wertheimer . Public Choice Versus Democracy 185 collective interests . Thi s consensua l argumen t fo r coercio n is , however, a s logicall y flawed a s th e notio n o f majoritaria n de mocracy . Al l tha t w e ma y rightl y conclud e fro m th e misfi t o f individual an d collectiv e interest s i s that w e would benefi t fro m having som e centra l determinatio n o f ou r actions . W e canno t conclude whic h o f severa l possibl e determination s w e shoul d make. The disconcertin g implicatio n o f public-choic e theor y i s tha t majoritarian democrac y i s both conceptuall y an d motivationall y flawed. Perhap s th e actua l practic e o f democrac y ma y sensibl y be viewed as a compromise t o live within the constraints of thes e perverse conclusions . Tha t practic e i s no t a n altogethe r happ y compromise becaus e it is not particularl y majoritarian . After a brie f historica l accoun t o f th e recognitio n o f th e dis coveries o f public-choic e theory , I addres s thei r bearin g o n democratic theor y an d practice . I the n examin e on e possibl e empirical escap e fro m th e negativ e implication s b y wa y o f th e communitarian clai m tha t w e d o no t fac e th e assumption s o r conclusions o f th e theory' s accoun t o f democracy . Finally , I consider a n alternativ e solutio n t o the difficultie s o f democrati c theory, namely , tha t institutional device s can achieve what dem ocratic choice may not. Throughout, m y concern i s majoritaria n democracy, tha t is , procedure s base d o n majorit y rule . Thi s i s the for m i n whic h w e fac e th e followin g problem s becaus e w e have come to accept merely majorit y rul e rather tha n t o requir e broad consensus to make democracy workable. In modern polit ical thought, th e core of the notion of democracy is its etymological core—rule b y the people—, which translates...

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