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While considerable media and popular attention has been concentrated on the role outside interest groups play in the modern-day federal judicial confirmation process, in reality, we know relatively little about the activities of these groups. Conventional wisdom suggests that outside groups drive the process itself, setting the terms of the debate and dictating the activities of like-minded senators. For example, the cover of the April 8, 2002, edition of the National Review featured a picture of then Judiciary Committee chair Patrick Leahy attached to marionette strings with the headline, “Strings Attached: How Liberal Interest Groups Control Senate Democrats.” Similarly, Judge Charles Pickering stated, in response to a question about why he was filibustered in 2005 but unanimously confirmed to a district court seat in 1990, “During this period of time these far-left special interest groups gained power and they had control of Democrats on the Judiciary Committee, and through the Senators on the Committee they gained control of the entire Democratic apparatus” (Giachino 2006). The previous chapters showed, however, that other factors might be at work in explaining why some nominees face long delays: nominees may be blocked by their home-state senators through the exercise of senatorial courtesy or their nominations may be turned down the private political track through the use of holds. Most important, the analysis in chapters 2 and 3 revealed that the capture of nominations by private political tactics is usually incidental to the actual disputes: nominations are captured by these parliamentary procedures out of convenience or because of their bargaining significance. Thus, senators do not merely trap nominees to appease like-minded interest groups. Nonetheless, we do know interest groups play an influential role in the lower court confirmation process. Since the start of the second Reagan administration, interest groups have been major players in the 4 INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONS A View from the Senate 96 Battle over the Bench process as they, along with presidents and senators, have increasingly recognized the far-reaching and long-term consequences of who sits on the federal bench. While groups have historically recognized the importance of Supreme Court vacancies (see, e.g., Abraham 1999; Frank 1991; Maltese 1995; Silverstein 1994), only recently have they turned their attention to lower court selection. In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, judicial watchdog groups formed on the left and the right, and other groups began monitoring lower court nominations as well. For groups concerned with policy issues in which court decisions play a prominent role—issues such as gay marriage, abortion rights, discrimination, and the death penalty—the Senate confirmation process affords one more arena in which to pursue their goals. The remaining chapters of this book explore what roles interest groups play in the lower court confirmation process and the impact of these activities. I begin by examining the different functions interest groups perform. Interest groups historically participated formally in the judicial confirmation process by testifying at confirmation hearings. Previous studies focus on assessing when groups testified and whether, through testifying, these groups influenced a lower court nominee’s likelihood of confirmation (Bell 2002a; Cohen 1998; Flemming, MacLeod, and Talbert 1998). Since the early 1990s, however, Judiciary Committee chairs have restricted the formal involvement of groups, so groups have turned to more informal mechanisms of participation. We know relatively little about groups’ informal activities. Seminal studies examine informal interest group activity in the context of particular , highly contested nominations (Bell 2002a; Caldeira, Hojnacki, and Wright 2000; Caldeira and Wright 1995, 1998), but no study to date has examined the full extent of the functions groups perform in the lower court confirmation process, including whether groups play any role in uncontested nominations. This chapter adds a different perspective to the debate over interest group activity by asking those who are most likely to be affected— senators and their staffs—what functions they believe interest groups perform. Senators and Senate staffers recognize that outside groups are a formidable force in the modern legislative arena. But are groups essential players in the lower court confirmation process, or are they a necessary evil that must be dealt with? Are groups the puppet masters of likeminded senators, or do they fill roles senators and their staffs cannot? This chapter aims to answer these questions by examining the results of interviews with thirty-two Senate staffers and one...

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