Boethius and Aquinas

5. Metaphysics and Existence

CHAPTER 5 Metaphysics and Existence Thomas's commentary on Boethius's De trinitate has occasioned claims that the metaphysics of Thomas is fundamentally different from that of Aristotle. The articles that stand at the beginning of this development, those of Robert and Geiger,l draw attention to the distinction made in the course of Question 5, Article 3, between abstractio and separatio. Geiger bases his remarks on the holograph as well and is thus able to show that the approach taken in the final version of the body of the article was one Thomas hit upon only after a certain amount of searching. Not that the two articles, which were written at about the same time, though quite independently of one another, are identical. Robert, setting out to show that metaphysics is a science distinct from every other discipline for St. Thomas, takes his cue from Van Steenberghen's effort to insulate philosophy from science , an effort that ends by seeing the various philosophical disciplines as forms of metaphysics. There is general metaphysics, which apparently comes first pedagogically as well as otherwise, and then there are many forms of special metaphysics-epistemology , philosophy of nature, psychology, and so on. No wonder Robert is concerned to show how metaphysics is a distinct discipline and not just a synonym for philosophy. What distinguishes it is separatio, since metaphysics considers things which are removed or separated from all matter and motion. Geiger was writing before the appearance of Wyser's edition I. Geiger, "Abstractio et separation d'apres S. Thomas: in de trinitate, q.5, a.3," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et theologiques, XXXI, 1947, pp. 3-40. Robert, J. D., O. P., "La metaphysique, science distinct de toute autre discipline philosophique selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Divus Thomas (Piacenza), L 1947, pp.2.06-2.2.3· 148 Metaphysics and Existence 149 of the fifth and sixth questions of Thomas's commentary on De trinitate,2 but he had access to the holographs which retain earlier versions of the body of the third article of Question 5. The final version moves with such ease that it comes as a surprise to find that Thomas made a number of false starts before he found the approach he wanted. The first version begins, "It should be said that the operation of intellect is completed insofar as the intellect is conformed with the intelligible." 3 He cites Algazel and Aristotle and continues on the basis of the fact that knowledge involves an assimilation. He cites the Boethius of De hebdomadibus to the effect that many things which are not separated in reality can be separated in thought" and then discusses things not amenable to this kind of separating. Why is it that some things which exist together have to be thought together? Well, sometimes the one is part of the notion of the other, as rational is of man. On the other hand, as in the case of father and son, some things which exist separately must nonetheless be thought together. It is when one thing is prior to another that the former can be understood without the latter. But whenever the connection is essential, separation is impossible . "For essence is the principle of being. Hence insofar as one thing can or cannot exist without another, it will be or not be dependent on it in its essence and thus in its understanding." 5 But then, after nearly fifty lines, Thomas stops and begins again. "It should be said that in order to make this question clear, we must see the diverse modes of abstraction whereby the intellect is said to abstract, and the reasons for them." 6 Now he cites 2. Paul Wyser, a.p., Thomas von Aquin In librum Boethii De trinitate Quaestiones Quinta et Sexta (Fribourg, 1948). 3. "Dicendum quod operatio intellectus completur secundum hoc quod intellectus conformatur intelligibili." In Bruno Decker, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Iibrum Boethii De trinitate (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1959), p. 231. 4. De hebdomadibus, ed. Stewart, Rand, Tester, p. 44.86-91. 5. "Essentia autem est principium essendi. Unde secundum quod aliquid sine altero esse potest vel non potest, sic secundum suam essentiam et per consequens secundum intellectum dependet ab ilIo vel non dependet." Ibid., p. 232.24-27. 6. "Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet [scire] videre diversos modos abstractionis, qua intellectus abstrahere dicitur, et rationes eorum." Ibid., p. 232.31-33. [3.138.110.119] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 07...