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5 Qua in re soluta est questio. Idcirco enim, licet in eo quod sint bona sint, non sunt tamen similia primo bono quoniam non quoquo modo sint res ipsum esse earum bonum est. Set quoniam non potest esse ipsum esse rerum nisi a primo esse defluxerit id est bono, idcirco ipsum esse bonum est nec est simile ei a quo est. Illud enim quoquo modo sit bonum est in eo quod est. Non enim aliud est preter quam bonum. Hoc autem nisi ab illo esset bonum fortasse esse posset, set bonum {10} in eo quod est esse non posset. Tunc enim participaret forsitan bono; ipsum uero esse quod non haberent a bono bonum habere non possent. Igitur sublato ab hiis bono primo mente et cogitatione, ista licet essent bona, tamen in eo quod essent bona esse non possent. Et quoniam actu non potuere existere nisi illud ea quod uere bonum est produxisset, idcirco et esse eorum bonum est et non est simile substanciali bono id quod ab eo fluxit. Et nisi ab eo fluxissent licet essent bona, tamen in eo quod sunt bona {20} esse non possent quoniam et preter bonum et non ex bono essent cum illud ipsum bonum primum est et ipsum esse sit et ipsum bonum et ipsum esse bonum. At non etiam alba in eo quod sunt alba esse oportebit ea que alba sunt quoniam ex uoluntate Dei fluxerunt ut essent alba? Minime: aliud enim est esse, aliud albis esse. Hoc ideo quoniam qui ea ut essent effecit bonus quidem est, minime uero albus. Voluntatem igitur boni comitatum est ut essent bona in eo quod sunt; uoluntatem uero non albi non est comitata talis {30} ei quidem proprietas ut esset album in eo quod est; neque enim ex albi uoluntate defluxerunt. Itaque, quia uoluit esse ea alba qui erat non albus, sunt alba tantum. Quia uero uoluit ea esse bona qui erat bonus, sunt bona in eo quod sunt. Secundum hanc igitur rationem, cuncta oportet esse iusta quoniam ipse iustus est qui ea esse uoluit? Ne hoc quidem, nam bonum esse essenciam, iustum uero esse actum respicit. Idem autem est in eo esse quod agere. Idem igitur bonum esse quod iustum. Nobis {40} uero non est idem esse quod agere: non enim 50 CHAPTER 5 In this very point the question has been solved. For on this account, although they may be good in this, that they are, still they are not similar to the First Good, because their very being is not good in whatever way things may be. But since the very being of things cannot be unless it flow down from the First Being, that is, from the Good, on that account their very being is good, but is not like That from Which it is. For It, in every way that It is, is Good in this, that It is. For It is nothing other than Good. However, unless this were from It, perhaps it could be good, but it could not be good {10} in this, that it is. Perhaps it might then participate in good, but its very being, which it25 would not possess from the Good, it could not possess as good. Therefore, the First Good taken away in mind and thought from these , although they might be good, still they could not be good in this, that they are. And since they could not actually exist unless That Which is truly Good had produced them, on that account both their being is good and that which flowed from the Substantial Good is not like It. And unless they had flowed from It, although they might be good, still they could not be {20} good in this, that they are, because they would be both outside the Good and not from the Good, whereas that First Good Itself is26 Being Itself; and the Good Itself; and Being, the Good Itself. But must it not also be the case that white things are white in this, that they are, since they are white because they have flowed from God’s will that they be white? Not at all: For it is one thing to be, and another for them to be white. This is the case, therefore, because He who effected that they be, indeed is Good, but surely is not white. Therefore, that they be good in this, that they are, is what accompanied the will of the Good; a property of this sort, that they be white in...

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