Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through Saint Thomas Aquinas

2. Intention

2 | Intention We are trying to identify the species of human actions. What belongs essentially to an action is a certain emanation from an agent toward some object. An action has a per se order from the agent to the object. What falls outside this order is circumstantial; it does not belong to the essence of the action. The movement or emanation of an action begins within the agent through some impulse or tendency, and this source within the agent provides the essential character of an action. Human actions, precisely as human, arise from reason and will; consequently, the intention of the will plays a central role in the species of human actions. If we wish to know to what the agent is ordered, then we must know what the agent intends . Unfortunately, it does little good to say that actions are specified through intention unless we can characterize intention itself. The doctor’s action is specified by her intention; if she intends to kill, then her action is a killing, but if she intends only to reduce the size of the head, then it is not a killing. But what does she intend ? Does she intend merely to save the life of the mother, since this is the goal that she seeks? Does the death of the baby fall outside her intention, since the death is not that by which she achieves her goal? Disputes amongst the followers of Aquinas over the species of actions have focused largely upon such questions. As we seek to pin down the character of intention, we will be44 intention 45 gin with general considerations about the nature of its object; is intention concerned only with the end sought or also with the means to achieve this end (section 2.1)? We will then turn our attention to more particular applications, first to the test case of self-defense (section 2.2) and then to some other cases (section 2.3). Section 2.1. What Is Intended Over the past fifty years the diverse views on the precise object of intention have multiplied beyond counting, but for our purposes the views may be reduced to three, a broad expansive view, a lean view, and a middle view. The broad view includes nearly everything foreseen within the scope of intention. The narrow view includes only the end aimed at, excluding both the means chosen to achieve the end and any consequences following upon the end, even those that are foreseen. The middle view includes both the means and the end but excludes side effects or foreseen consequences. When Jones kills Smith, for instance, the first view holds not only that Jones intends to kill Smith, but also that he intends to make a noise, for he foresees that his action will result in a noise, and he must intend all foreseen consequences. On the second view, Jones might intend the money he hopes to gain from his murder, but he does not intend the means chosen to achieve this end, such as firing the gun or killing Smith, nor does he intend consequences such as the noise. On the third view, Jones intends to kill Smith and he also intends the means of firing the gun, but he does not intend foreseen side effects, such as the noise. We will call these views, respectively, concomitant-intention, end-intention, and meansintention . In recent years, concomitant-intention has been largely discredited.1 Certainly, no one would maintain that Aquinas de1 . See, for instance, Michael Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 139–64; Brock, Action and Conduct, 200–16; Bennett, Act Itself, 96. 46 intention fends concomitant-intention. Therefore, we will turn our attention to the remaining two views (sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). 2.1.1. End-Intention End-intention maintains that we intend the end or goal of our actions but nothing else. We do not intend concomitant effects, nor do we intend the means chosen to achieve our goals. We intend only what is truly desired, such as the money Jones wishes to steal from Smith, and not those actions that get us to it, such as killing Smith. When applied to the craniotomy case, we may conclude that the doctor intends to save the mother’s life but not to kill the baby. In defense of end-intention, Long cites the following text...