In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

56 Three • Types of Essential Structures Stein posits individual form as a metaphysically real principle distinct in content for each finite personal being. In the following three chapters I would like to look more carefully at the kind of principle the individual form is intended to be and therefore the role it plays in making each of us individual. In order to do so, it is necessary to look at Stein’s general theory of essence and essential structures (chapter 3), her account of being (chapter 4), and the way in which individual forms in particular fit into Stein’s account of both and thus act as a principle of individuality (chapter 5). My primary interest in this chapter will be (a) to contrast briefly the two major traditions Stein is drawing from in Finite and Eternal Being on the question of essence, (b) to distinguish Stein’s differing types of essential structures, including essences and essentialities, and (c) to articulate briefly how the differing structures are nonetheless related. (The first and second sections will be important for appreciating Stein’s position regarding individual forms; the third clarifies a number of claims but is not necessary for the broader analysis .) Although the theme of this chapter is Stein’s differing types of essential structures, I will save discussion of one further structural component—substantial form [Wesensform]—for chapter 5. The Scholastic and Phenomenological Traditions Part of Stein’s aim is to find a common language for medieval and contemporary philosophy,1 and her project is clearly one of synthesis. 1. See EeS 7/ESG 15/FEB 6–7. The dominant medieval figures Stein has in mind are Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. 57 Types of Essential Structures In the foreword to Finite and Eternal Being, she claims that this text represents a “coming-together” of phenomenology and Thomism.2 This should not be understood as an attempt to remain true to the fundamental tenets of either phenomenology or Thomism but, rather , in a creative venue, as Stein’s own metaphysical positions, which draw heavily from both traditions and attempt to reconcile them to the degree and in the ways that fit with her own projects. It is worth noting that “scholasticism” is by no means identical with Thomism or any particular philosophical position. “Scholasticism ” refers to a way of doing philosophy rather than any set of claims. Nonetheless, the prominence of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas in the scholastic debates is significant. When phenomenology first appeared, some people hailed it as (or accused it of being) a return to scholasticism.3 Strong strains in philosophy since Kant have argued that our concepts, personal and social histories, experiences , and language so shape our understanding of the world that we cannot know the world as it truly is or as it is in itself, but rather only as it appears to us. Phenomenology, certainly in the early phenomenological schools, did not accept this Kantian position.4 2. See EeS viii/ESG 3/FEB xxiii. Finite and Eternal Being is Stein’s third attempt to bring these two philosophical worlds together. Her first was her article written for Husserl’s Festschrift (written twice, both of which are published in Knowledge and Faith) and the second was her Habilitationsschrift Potenz und Akt. 3. In her dissertation, Mary Catharine Baseheart says, “In Husserl’s early works some of the critics of his phenomenology and of Scholastic philosophy saw a retrogression to medieval concepts and theories” (preface, Encounter, ii), and Husserl is quoted as saying that phenomenology “converges toward Thomism and prolongs Thomism” (see Elisabeth de Miribel’s Edith Stein: 1891–1942 [Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1956], 73, and Jude Dougherty’s “Edith Stein’s Conversion: How a Jewish Philosopher Became a Catholic Saint,” Crisis 10, no. 11 [December 1992]: 41). See also Husserl’s comments comparing his approach to scholasticism in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” in Husserl: Shorter Works, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), 175 and 176. 4. Kant’s claims also put in question the traditional metaphysical project of articulating the nature of reality. Although the early phenomenologists rejected Kant’s phenomena-noumena distinction and subsequent denial that we have access to the real, phenomenologists have tended to be hesitant about the move to traditional metaphysics. Husserl, for example, describes phenomenology as first philosophy (and not metaphysics), sharply distinguishing the two, and he is [3.146.152.99] Project MUSE (2024-04-25...

Share