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Appendix Rosmini’s Own Account of the Problem of Knowledge The aim of this appendix is not to discuss critically Rosminian epistemology in its historical context, but rather to offer a summary of the analyses that led him to the solution he finally proposed. My concern, therefore, is not whether or not his readings are justified and correct in every detail. I assume that his approach, even if it is not the only possible one, is still valid and justifies his conclusions. The problem of knowledge is such a rich one that there can be many legitimate ways to attack it. However, a keen and attentive reading shows that Rosmini’s hermeneutics enlightens epistemology in an unusually significant way. His observations supply the elements for understanding other aspects of the theory of knowledge, many of them also discussed in the Nuovo saggio. For this reason, I will follow his account of the problem, without discussing its adequateness in particular. I am convinced that a correct understanding of Rosmini’s analyses will make it easier to accept the innatism of the idea, a central thesis for the whole Rosminian system, and particularly for the problem of personal dignity.1 n According to Rosmini, philosophers have primarily chosen two false ways to explain satisfactorily the existence of ideas: some gave insufficient reasons for them, whereas others assigned them an excessive cause. Locke assigned two sources to knowledge: sensation and reflection upon sensation. He rejected the idea of substance because its origin was not in any of them. Rosmini’s answer to Locke is that, as a matter of fact, the idea of substance is the result of a judgment. In fact, when we perceive a sensation, we say: “Sensitive qualities cannot exist without some kind of support.” We would not be able to pronounce such a judgment if we did not previously  1. For a more detailed analysis, I refer the reader to Rosmini’s own Nuovo saggio (vol. 1 of the English translation: An Historical Critique): Locke (47–64), Condillac (65– 98), Reid (99–132), Smith (136–62), Stewart (163–209), Plato and Aristotle (222–77), Leibniz (278–300), Hume (310–19), Kant (301–9, 324–84). The paragraphs between the analysis of each philosopher supply introductions, summaries, or conclusions that facilitate the comprehension of the text. Also he makes frequent cross-references. In paragraphs 385–96 Rosmini makes a summary of the preceding explanations. possess the idea of existence, which informs us of the impossibility of sensitive qualities existing on their own. This idea is universal, while sensations and sensitive qualities are particular. The idea of a corporal substance is thus obtained after a judgment that requires (1) sensations; and (2) the idea of existence . The mind must have this idea in itself. We cannot argue that it is taken from the particular idea of a thing or of a substance, because we saw that it is already necessary in order to form the idea of the thing. If the intellect sees in the particular idea some universal element (for example, the idea of existence ), it is because it was already placed there. Neither sensations nor reflection can account for the idea of substance; nonetheless, this idea exists; therefore , there must be another source of knowledge. Now, if a judgment is required to form our ideas and a primary idea is also needed to form the first judgment, this idea must be present in the mind before the first judgment takes place. This first judgment cannot have an idea as subject, but a sensation or a group of sensations, or else the problem becomes impossible to solve. This does not imply, however, that an idea cannot be the subject of a judgment of existence, but only that this must not be the case necessarily, as it would result in the aforementioned contradictions. In Locke’s philosophy, there is also a constant confusion between the sense and the intellect and between their corresponding operations. Condillac saw that Locke had overlooked the judgment that immediately follows the sensation, but he attributed the judgment to the senses, consequently reducing ideas to “modified sensation.” The Scottish school (mainly Reid) had to fight the idealism and skepticism produced by Locke’s system in England and represented by Berkeley and Hume. Reid, too, recognized that a judgment was needed to know the existence of things, and he saw clearly that this operation could not be performed simply by the senses. He affirmed the existence of a...

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