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QUESTIONS 33-35 63 delight. For if he covets, since covetousness is nothing else but the love of transient things, it is necessary to fear lest either he lose them, once acquired, or not get them. But he does not fear, therefore he does covet. Again, if he is tormented by mental anguish, it is necessary that he also be vexed by fear, because anguish results from present evils whose imminence occasions fear. But he is free of fear, therefore, of anguish also. Again, if he is frivolously joyful, he is joyful over those things which he can lose. For this reason, it is necessary to fear lest he lose them. But he has no fear whatever, so he does not rejoice frivolously at all. 34. MUST NOTHING ELSE BE LOVED BUT FREEDOM FROM FEAR? If freedom from fear is a vice, then it must not be loved. But no one who is completely happy is fearful, and everyone who is completely happy is without vice. Accordingly it is not a vice not to be afraid. Now presumptuousness is a vice. Therefore not everyone who does not fear is presumptuous, although everyone who is presumptuous does not fear. Again, there are no corpses which fear. For this reason, since the absence of fear is common to the completely happy person, to the presumptuous person, and to the corpse, but the perfectly happy man possesses that quality by the serenity of his mind, the presumptuous man by his foolhardiness, and the corpse by its complete lifelessness, it follows that neither must freedom from fear not be loved (because we desire to be happy), nor must it alone be loved (because we do not want to be presumptuous and devoid of life). 35. WHAT OUGHT TO BE LOVED?I (1) Since lifeless things do not fear, nor would we be persuaded to deprive ourselves of life so that we could be free of Cf. R 1.26 (PL 32.625): "I do not completely approve of my claim that 'that should be loved which is possessed in the knowing of it.' For ...

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