The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell

4. Cross-Cultural Leadership: Dwight D. Eisenhower

4 Cross-Cultural Leadership Dwight D. Eisenhower Kerry E. Irish Many people have analyzed Dwight D. Eisenhower’s leadership as supreme Allied commander in Europe during World War II. Less known are the origins of his leadership principles and the fact that Eisenhower did not relate to other Allied leaders in an impromptu manner, relying on charm and a smile, as much as he endeavored to execute long-held and deeply believed cross-cultural leadership concepts . Indeed, much of Eisenhower’s prior military career was a study of coalition leadership. From his tutorial under Brigadier General Fox Conner in Panama to his appointment as chief of staff of the American military mission to the Philippines under Major General Douglas MacArthur, Eisenhower’s cross-cultural leadership philosophy had gradually taken form. The cornerstone of Eisenhower’s leadership philosophy was the idea that America’s next major war, a second world war, could be won only with allies. He believed that a truly unified allied command, a cross-cultural command, would have to be created. It followed from this premise that nationalist concerns and individual egos would have to be subordinated to the allied team. The coalition commander would have to accept responsibility for allied decisions and share the glory for victories. He must also delegate authority intelligently to the various team members and insist that all personnel prepare to wage war with the highest possible efficiency. Moreover, the commander dwiGHt d. eiSenHower (National Archives, College Park, MD) Cross-Cultural Leadership 95 would have to show humility, patience, and flexibility to gain the confidence of coalition members. The successful allied commander would have to treat the people of other nations as equals in terms of basic human dignity. Eisenhower demonstrated all of these qualities as supreme Allied commander during World War II. In early 1922, Eisenhower arrived in Panama at the request of Brigadier General Conner. Conner hoped Ike would help him make the Twentieth Brigade, which was assigned to protect the Panama Canal, an effective fighting force, something it had not been for some time. Conner was an erudite southerner who enjoyed mentoring junior officers, an unusual quality within the interwar American army.1 Senior officers seldom mentored junior officers with the skill and energy that Conner invested in Eisenhower; and most junior officers would not have responded as well as Ike did. In commenting on the Conner-Eisenhower relationship, Roscoe Woodruff, a classmate of Ike’s at West Point who served in Panama in the early 1920s, remarked that had he been Conner’s protégé, he would not have regarded it as a great opportunity: “I had little to do with my assignments . In other words, if they told me to do this, I did it. What I am trying to get at is, I didn’t look ahead. Very few people do really.” Woodruff was “quite sure” that it was Conner who “urged Ike to do certain things,” to think about “looking forward to his own career.” Woodruff concluded that “Ike was far ahead of most of his contemporaries ” in that regard.2 Among other things, Conner revived Eisenhower’s interest in military history.3 Ike set up a reading alcove in his ramshackle quarters and made good use of his spare time. Upon finishing a book borrowed from Conner’s excellent library, he and the general would discuss it as they rode horses about the post. The years with Conner essentially provided a graduate education in military history and the humanities. Conner provided Ike with key principles of leadership. The general convinced his young scholar that unity of command was essential, that a large campaign must have one commander over all of its forces: air, naval, and ground.4 Eisenhower later wrote of his education under Conner, “One of the subjects on which he talked 96 Kerry E. Irish to me most was allied command, its difficulties and its problems. . . . Again and again General Conner said to me, ‘We cannot escape another great war. When we go into that war it will be in company with allies. Systems of single command will have to be worked out. . . . We must insist on individual and single responsibility—leaders will have to learn how to overcome nationalistic considerations in the conduct of campaigns.’”5 In the Great War, Conner had seen firsthand the arrogance of some of the British and French officers, so he taught Eisenhower that a...