Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces

14. The Approach of Mounted Warfare in the Marine Corps (1970-95)

14 The Approach of Mounted Warfare in the Marine Corps (1970-95) Kenneth W. Estes The fluid and often confused nature of Vietnam War engagements left little legacy for the Corps. Interservice rivalries, especially over the control of airpower and lesser-scale spats over the command of large ground formations, left many senior Marine Commanders wary of the future American way of war. Marines felt reassured that their emphasis on small-unit tactics and leadership had been rewarded. However, there was less certainty over the impact of heavy weapons systems in the long and agonizing campaign that resulted in such a seemingly indifferent outcome. On the other hand, the traditional Cold War enemy remained in place and the Corps clearly returned to post-World War II concepts of mobilization and reinforcement of the European theater. With that renewed emphasis , one could anticipate a reassessment of the firepower and mobility resident in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), and the modernization of armored fighting vehicles not deemed crucial to operations in Southeast Asia. A new amtrac was the first major hardware item the Corps acquired in the post-Vietnam era, and it proved to be a thoroughbred. The Commandant had hoped to field it in FY 1967 and contracted in June 1962 for six LVTPX11 prototypes to be delivered by the end of 1963. The Mounted Warefare in the Marine Corps 475 The LVTP7. Naval Institute. headquarters staff took direct control of the development program, charging the Landing Force Development Activity (later the Developmental Center) as the program manager. An ambitious Borg-Warner design using a Lycoming gas turbine, electric drive, band track, and improved armor was specified. Unfortunately, the program was canceled in mid-1963 when the design proved unfeasible because of propeller propulsion limitations and the unfortunate beam-length ratio. Smarting from these setbacks, the Corps turned to the FMC Corporation in its search for a more conventional tracked vehicle.1 Between 1967 and 1968 the Corps took delivery of fourteen prototypes of the LVTPX12—a nineteen-ton carrier for twenty-five troops that featured a torsion bar suspension and 400 horsepower Detroit Diesel engine linked to water jets. The vehicle was capable of driving forty miles per hour on land and eight miles per hour in water. Testing through 1969 revealed it to be highly superior in all measures to the LVTP5 family except in internal volume. It particularly distinguished itself in surf, crossing through plunging surf in excess of ten feet while fully loaded. Although prototypes included a 20mm cannon and 7.62mm machine gun in a power turret, the first production version delivered for testing in October 1971 featured the .50-caliber M85 machine-gun. The HispanoSuiza 20mm cannon had caused problems and project officers feared the heavier weapon would be employed as an assault gun.2 The new LVTP7 began to reach the FMF in 1972, but only addi- 476 Kenneth W. Estes tional recovery and command variants were produced. No engineer or armored amphibians were built owing to budget limitations. The same year, the Corps retired the M103 and M67 tanks and established the four-company, all-medium tank battalion as standard. Hopes ran high that the XM803 tank would be purchased, giving the Corps a state-ofthe -art tank in place of the aging M48. The failure of this last vestige of the Army's MBT70 program threw the Corps into a quandary. The M48, even if up-gunned, would not fare well in combat with Warsaw Pact armor. Once more, the standard Army tank had to be acquired, and the M60A1 replaced the Corps's M48s in 1974, followed in 1977by the newest production M60A1 (RISE)(PASSIVE), which featured passive night sights, full stabilization, and the "reliability improved" engine. However, much work remained to be done, for Marine Corps units and leaders lacked experience in the conduct of mechanized operations. The tank battalion and assault amphibian battalions returned to the division organization from force troops in 1976-77, marking the end of the "light" period brought on by the Hogaboom Board. Even with an improved amtrac, redesignated as the assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) in 1985, and the current main battle tank, modern notions of combined arms grew slowly in the FMF. Marines did poorly in the "Strafer Zuegel" NATO exercise in which a Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) participated in an exercise in northern Germany. Restricted from using helicopters in the accustomed...