Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces

13. The Abrams Tank System

13 The Abrams Tank System Robert J. Sunell At the conclusion of the ground war in the Persian Gulf on 26 February 1991, the 3,113 Abrams tanks in the region maintained a readiness rate of 90 percent or higher. Through the course of the hundred-hour ground war, it was quite evident that the Abrams was exhibiting outstanding reliability, lethality, mobility, and survivability. Several Abrams MlAls reported minimal frontal damage despite hits by 125mm smoothbore rounds fired from Iraqi T-72s. Not a single Abrams was destroyed or penetrated by the enemy during the war. Army observers and tank crews alike were impressed with the power and accuracy of the Abrams's 120mm smoothbore gun. In addition, U.S. tankers raved about the power and performance of the turbine engine.1 How did the U.S. Army come to develop such an imposing combat fighting vehicle, considered today one of the best tanks in the world? It is impossible to cover all the details of the Abrams tank story in a single chapter. To cover it from concept formulation through production would require, at a minimum, an entire book. I therefore have elected to cover only those events that were major turning points during the history of the Abrams tank program. The Abrams story is more than just a story about a tank; it is also the story of the people and organizations that made that tank a reality. Numerous hands and minds helped shape the design of this great fighting machine, so I must limit myself to a discussion of only those key personnel who were critical to the Abrams project. The Ml tank project grew out of the failure of two other attempts to build a replacement for the U.S. Patton tank series. The first was the The Abrams Tank System 433 The MBT70. Patton Museum. joint United States-West German MBT70 project launched by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. No sooner had Congress provided funding for this joint venture than a series of developmental problems began to delay it. By the end of 1969, the MBT70 was mired in international management dilemmas, conflicting national priorities, persistent cost overruns, and technical problems with the turret-mounted 152mm gun-missile system, novel automatic loader, variable compression ratio diesel engine, and enhanced adjustable hydro-pneumatic suspension system.2 In January 1970, when the U.S.-German alliance disintegrated, a Congress decided to pursue a unilateral austere version, the XM803, for the United States. The following year, however, both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees found the XM803 too costly and sophisticated to justify further development. Many committee members believed that tanks were nearing the end of their combat usefulness , their extinction threatened by a new generation of antitank guided missiles (ATGM).3 Senator Thomas F. Eagleton best represented the congressional mood when he said that tanks were too vulnerable and had grown less valuable in the United States's overall defense effort.4 Shortly after Congress terminated the Cheyenne helicopter program due to cost overruns, Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland unilaterally eliminated the XM803 program. The West Germans, meanwhile, pursued development of what became the Leopard 2 tank. 434 Robert J. Sunell The Army defended its request for the tank as its principal landbased weapon system by arguing that tanks were to be used not only against enemy tanks but in various mutually supporting roles in combination with mechanized infantry, artillery, and tactical airpower. Despite the Army's arguments, many congressional leaders were adamant that tanks would no longer be able to survive on a European battlefield. In the wake of the MBT70/XM803 imbroglio, Congress encouraged the Army to continue to develop the M60A2, with its dual gun-missile launcher system, stating the that XM803 offered no advantage over the M60A1E2 except a slight edge in cruising range and speed.5 In December 1971 a joint House-Senate conference committee issued a report on the Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations bill, noting: "The committee continues to feel that the MBT70/XM803 is unnecessarily complex, excessively sophisticated and too expensive, and that the Army has failed to satisfy the recommendation of the committee report on the fiscal 1970 bill. For these reasons the Committee has recommended that all funds for the MBT70/XM803 be deleted from the budget and the program be terminated."6 A dissenting view came from Gen. James H. Polk...