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• 4 SURVIVAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Is There a Credible Threat to U.S. Space Systems? Simple mathematics can demonstrate what otherwise might be clouded by more sophisticated defense analysis. Although not nearly the final word on this subject, numbers do talk. The space budgets of NASA and the Department of Defense have gone from 1959 levels of $1,266 billion and $2,377 billion, respectively, to 1998 levels of $12,321 billion and $12,359 billion (fiscal year 1998 constant dollars ).1 In July 2000, the United States had a total of 741 operational and inactive satellites in orbit.2 New remote-sensing, scientific, meteorological, and dedicated military satellites also will swarm the skies. Orbital traffic, in other words, is expected to become heavy. Ten years hence and beyond, when the United States will have larger and more intricate space architectures in low, mid-, and geosynchronous Earth orbits, reliance on satellites may be expected to increase by one or two orders of magnitude. The steady rise in the number of space systems necessarily increases opportunities for accidental failures or intentional disruptions, and it raises fundamental issues pertaining to satellite system frailty and vulnerability. The law of averages will ensure adversity a place in space. The United States' expanding, boundless trust in space-based assets to perform a full spectrum of military, civil, scientific, and commercial activities parallels its growing inability to act on Earth without them. This dependency on the orbital engines of the modern information revolution may even rival the country's twentieth-century industrial reliance on electricity and oil. Although hailed today as the backbone of national economic security and crux of its military power, the elevated exposure of U.S. satellite constellations to the malignant workings of misfortune or the malice of future enemies is a condition that should light a fire of concern in all Americans. Survival in the Twenty-first Century 113 Chance and animosity are continually at work, so that even under the best conditions , the United States cannot always be guaranteed access to space. Indeed, in the past fifteen years, some eye-opening experiences have shown how tenuous its hold on space actually can be. Incidents dating back to the mid-1980s, moreover, are most instructive to the defense planner, who, in the absence of any guarantee that the country's space systems will remain unmolested indefinitely, may best be counseled to take into account the consequences of failure or interruption. An unfortunate string of launch failures in 1985 and 1986 highlighted the folly of (1) taking anything having to do with space for granted and (2) limiting one's options unnecessarily. For much of 1986 the United States lost a major space capability—its ability to place heavy objects, major defense space systems, into orbit. Most will remember the January 1986 catastrophic and tragic loss of the space shuttle Challenger. This was a painful national experience in more than one way. Until the loss of STS-51Ly the national space transportation strategy featured a steadily increasing reliance on the semireusable space shuttle at the expense of expendable boosters. Indeed, based on the shuttle's success record, the wheels were set in motion to stop production and even dismantle existing expendable launch vehicles. The country was in the process of consolidating all of its eggs into one basket—and then the basket fell... and the country lost one-fourth of its shuttle orbiter fleet. After the Challenger disaster, a statistically predicted event, the future of the space shuttle program was uncertain. The now-three-orbiter fleet was deactivated for an indefinite period of time. Both the Pentagon and NASA turned to McDonnell Douglas to restart the Delta expendable launch vehicle production. But it takes time to reorganize specialized production teams comprised of highly experienced professionals. McDonnell Douglas indicated that it would be unable to deliver new launchers for at least eighteen months, while administration officials at the time estimated that the waiting period would be two to three years.3 The air force also considered increasing Titan 34D production, which, from beginning to end, is a two-year process.4 Not only did the country have a frightening booster shortage and serious payload backup problem developing from the radically diminished number of rides into orbit, but before 1986 was over, a series of expendable launch vehicle failures lifted the veil on a nagging secret the United States had been keeping from itself—the country did not have reliable access to space...

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