So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos

2. A Wide Measure of Discretion

chapter 2 a Wide Measure of discretion The basic Lao policy choice confronting President Kennedy in early august 1961 was either military intervention to back Phoumi or diplomatic support for Prince Souvanna Phouma as prime minister of a coalition government . Souvanna was, quite simply, the only candidate for the position with any chance of receiving the approval of the kingdom’s three political factions and their international supporters. “if we are not prepared [to] use force to avoid him,” ambassador Brown advised, “we should begin to try affirmatively to make the best of him.” averell harriman agreed with Brown’s analysis, observing that a renewal of hostilities was the only alternative to “accepting Souvanna as prime minister.”1 Born in the royal capital of Luang Prabang in 1901, Souvanna was a French-educated engineer who enjoyed bridge, fine wine, and a good cigar. a leader of the post-World War ii Lao issara independence movement , he served three nonconsecutive terms as prime minister between 1950 and 1960—a record that reflected both his stature within the kingdom and the political instability of the country. The eisenhower administration viewed Souvanna’s neutralism with hostility, undermined his government in the mid-1950s, and helped put his conservative political rivals in power in 1958 and again in 1960. Many uS officials, particularly in the military and the cia, still distrusted Souvanna for his insufficient appreciation of the threat posed by communism and the Pathet Lao. admiral Felt declared to the Joint chiefs of Staff: “There has been more wishful thinking about Souvanna in the free world [than] about any other character except Fidel castro.”2 even american officials more sympathetic to Souvanna viewed him as naïve and excessively self-confident in his ability to manage the competing domestic and international forces affecting Laotian neutrality and independence. Souvanna, claiming that communism was incompatible 38 So Much to Lose with the Lao national character, was “certain that once outside influences are removed, the Pathet Lao hard-core can be isolated and their sympathizers drawn back into the fold.”3 Kennedy reluctantly agreed to pursue the “Souvanna solution.” dean rusk discussed the shift in uS policy with French foreign minister Maurice couve de Murville and the uK foreign secretary, Lord home, at a meeting in Paris on august 7, 1961. The British and French had long thought that uS support for Phoumi and objections to Souvanna were misguided. in the europeans’ view, Phoumi was a dictator who lacked military competence and political support. Souvanna, on the other hand, was a statesman who was friendlier to the West than most americans believed. “There must be a Laotian government headed by Souvanna,” couve had written rusk. “We all know that there is no other solution.”4 in Paris, rusk made it clear that uS support for a coalition government led by Souvanna came with conditions: none of the key cabinet portfolios—foreign affairs, defense, or interior—could go to the nLhS, the political arm of the Pathet Lao. The inclusion of a limited number of nLhS ministers had to be balanced by representation from the Boun oum-Phoumi faction. and the center group in a Souvanna government could not be restricted to the leftists who had followed him into exile. (Quinim Pholsena, a former rLG minister who had requested Soviet and north Vietnamese assistance for the neutralists after the battle of Vientiane, seemed particularly untrustworthy to the americans.) The Lao government must be genuinely neutral, rusk told couve and home: the united States would not put its “stamp of approval on a fraud.”5 uS support for Souvanna also required a revitalized icc capable of monitoring the ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the introduction of foreign military equipment and personnel. after the 1954 Geneva conference, the commission had been hindered in fulfilling a similar role in indochina by limitations on the movement of icc inspectors and by a “unanimity principle” that often paralyzed the work of the canadians, indians, and Poles. a new agreement in Geneva, uS officials insisted, would have to provide freedom of action for the icc and prevent the Poles from vetoing investigations of Pathet Lao and north Vietnamese violations. French and British officials shared uS aspirations for the commission, but Souvanna insisted that its investigations would require the consent of the Lao government. Privately, he was more flex- a Wide Measure of discretion 39 ible, indicating that his government...