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4 The Mayaguez Incident USSAG/7AF had just completed its responsibilities for the emergency evacuations of American citizens from Cambodia and South Vietnam, and with the loss of those two countries to the communists our headquarters was due to stand down on 30 June. Personnel were enjoying the calm after the hectic days of April 1975. Shortly after noon on 13 May we received an important message from the JCS that the Cambodians had commandeered a U.S. merchant ship in the Gulf of Thailand and we were to immediately launch aircraft to locate the ship. We quickly went to the command center and directed two standby F-111 aircraft, which were on an alert status, to locate the vessel. They found it at anchor about one kilometer off Koh Tang Island. Subsequently, the JCS directed us to maintain constant surveillance and take any actions necessary to ensure that the vessel did not enter a Cambodian port. Koh Tang Island was only thirty miles from the major port of Kompong Som. The Seventh Air Force battle staff took over the operation, with the aircraft assets available from the airbases in Thailand, which included F-4s, F-111s, A-7s, OV-10s, C-130s, KC-135s, and helicopters, as well as an airborne command and control aircraft, which was deployed from Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The U.S. merchant vessel was a container ship called the SS Mayaguez . Washington obviously was very displeased with this affront by the Cambodians, and strong actions might have to be taken to secure the release of the Mayaguez and its crew. CINCPAC directed Lieutenant General Burns to plan for a helicopter assault operation to land on top of the Mayaguez’s containers and take the vessel by force. The only troops in country at that time trained for such an operation were those in the air force security police unit stationed at NKP. When the 300 Losing Vietnam unit was asked for volunteers, every member stood tall. So USSAG made plans for a helicopter assault at first light on 14 May. That evening , about a hundred air force security police went by helicopter to U-Tapao, the closest U.S. base in Thailand to Koh Tang, which was to be used as the staging area. During the transfer, a CH-53 crashed, killing eighteen security police and five crew members on board. It was downed in the same area in which a previous helicopter crash had occurred several months earlier. This caused some serious initial concerns: at the time, there were many unidentified aircraft reportings from southern Laos. However, the cause of the accident was definitely established as a mechanical failure. At U-Tapao, at 0400 hours on 14 May, the security police and helicopter crews were ready to seize the Mayaguez. However, the order to execute was not given. Subsequently, two platoons of marines from Cubic Point in the Philippines and a marine combat battalion from Okinawa were deployed to U-Tapao. As the marines arrived, they replaced the security police, who were still on alert status. Late in the day on 13 May, USSAG/7AF received instructions to sanitize the island—that is, to isolate the area so no boats could leave the island for the mainland, and, in particular, no shipping could reinforce Koh Tang. Only movement between the Mayaguez and the island was to be allowed. During the evening, AC-130 and F-111 aircraft monitored watercraft in the area. In the morning, tactical aircraft were on station. The Seventh Air Force had established rules of engagement and ordinance requirements as well as the aircraft tasking necessary to ensure constant surveillance. On the morning of 14 May, I was at the command center observing activities and Lieutenant General Burns and the Seventh Air Force staff were in a planning session. A little after 0800, the aircraft on station reported that three vessels had departed Koh Tang, heading in different directions toward the mainland. In following instructions, the fighter aircraft engaged the leading vessel. It first fired rockets and .20-caliber machine guns forward of the craft. When the craft did not alter its course, A-7s dropped CBU-30 canisters filled with the riotcontrol agent CS on the speeding patrol boat. When this had no effect, the pilot asked for instructions and I responded, “Sink it”—which he proceeded to do. When our aircraft initiated the same procedures [3.149.230.44] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 13...

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