Rückzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944

Conclusion

281 Conclusion Toward the end of August 1944, the Americans had punched through the wobbly front line of Army Group B in the area east of Paris. Early in September, the Allies had managed to form the Mons Pocket. It seemed that the breakup of the German defense lines, which had barely been averted following the losses at Falaise and during the Seine River crossing, was now inevitable. The center of Army Group B had been shattered. The breakthrough led to the climax of the war of maneuver. Attacking toward Antwerp, the British on September 4 seized for the first time an undestroyed major port. Simultaneously, they encircled the German Fifteenth Army on the south bank of the Scheldt River. Both the Germans and the Allies at that point reached similar assessments on the future of combat operations . Field Marshal Model believed that “the gateway to northwest Germany was open.” During those first few days of September the Germans could not have blocked a large-scale Allied offensive between Aachen and Trier. At OB West headquarters there was even talk of an operational -level hole between the Meuse and Mosel rivers. General Eisenhower saw signs of a German collapse all along the front. Convinced that the defeat of the German armies was complete, he concluded that the Allies could push wherever they wanted. The final German collapse in the west, and even the end of the war, seemed to be just around the corner. But things did not happen that way. The presumed imminent defeat of the Germans did not materialize . By three weeks after the capture of Antwerp the situation had changed completely. The Germans had consolidated their situation to the point where Field Marshal von Rundstedt, without knowing about the decision that Hitler had already made to launch the Ardennes Offensive, himself began to think about staging a major counterattack.1 On September 29, Eisenhower had to admit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Germans had managed to form a “relatively stable front.”2 Although it was, of course, only a temporary stabilization of the front in the west, what were the reasons for that accomplishment ? What were the reasons for the transition from a war 282 Rückzug of maneuver to positional warfare? There was neither a so-called “miracle at the West Wall,” nor a similarly inexplicable phenomenon that led to the surprising consolidation of the German front that ran from the southern Netherlands, to Aachen, to the Mosel River area, and to Belfort. Rather, it was the interplay of several factors and decisions that caused the abrupt change in the nature of the fighting. On the German side, Hitler’s counteroffensive plans and the resulting preparations do not supply an adequate explanation. But as Hitler had told Jodl on July 31, a change in the situation in the west was essential to bring about because that was where “Germany’s destiny will be decided.” As he spelled it out in the basic concept of Führer Directive 51, it was only in the west that Hitler saw any possibility of achieving with the still-available forces and resources a far-reaching military success that could be exploited at the overall strategic level. Hitler therefore ordered that the forces generated through Germany ’s second “total mobilization” be concentrated in the west. But those new forces only started to influence the situation some two weeks after the climax of the German crisis in the west. The first of the twenty-five Volksgrenadier divisions, whose raising Hitler had ordered in conjunction with his intent to launch a counteroffensive, did not enter combat in the west prior to September 16–17. But the indicators that the situation was starting to stabilize were already unmistakable by September 11. By the end of the month another five Volksgrenadier divisions plus numerous fortress units had entered the front lines. Those reinforcements undoubtedly contributed to the stabilization of the situation. But the decisive prerequisites for that stabilization had already been established. Thanks to the operational readiness of the troops and the ability of the chain of command, the German Army of the West had been pulled back in better condition than originally expected. Model’s and Blaskowitz’s achievements, therefore, must be rated particularly high, because it was already too late for the execution of orderly withdrawal operations by the time Hitler on August 16 gave the approval for the long-overdue retreat from the occupied French territory in the west...