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143 6 Comparing the Bush Presidencies In 1830, John Quincy Adams wrote about the collision course between the West and the Islamic world. He argued that Islamic civilization would not accept the West’s notions of liberty and equality, and the West had a right to defend its values and interests against Islam. According to Adams, “Between [Christianity and Islam], thus contrasted in their characters, a war of twelve hundred years has already raged. That war is yet flagrant; nor can it cease but by the extinction of that imposture, which has been permitted by Providence to prolong the degeneracy of man. While the merciless and dissolute dogmas of the false prophet shall furnish motives to human action, there can never be peace upon earth, and good will towards men. . . . The precept of the Koran is, perpetual war against all who deny, that Mahomet is the prophet of God.”1 Although I disagree with Adams’s premise, his words are particularly prescient when one considers the foreign policies of the George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush presidencies. Both presidents left a legacy of war and peace in the Middle East. In 1988, one would have been hard-pressed to believe that George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush would both be president and even more hard-pressed to predict that American foreign policy after the cold war would be defined, to a large measure, by interactions with a major state in the Middle East, Iraq. Moreover, that the two conflicts in Iraq would be undertaken by presidents related as father and son would have been unimaginable. Despite this unique situation, the conflicts in Iraq were commenced in very different ways with very different results. Likewise, the two Bush administrations’ approaches to the Middle East peace process were also very different. 144 THE GULF On War Richard Haass, a participant in both Bush administrations, has astutely labeled the two wars in Iraq as respectively a war of necessity and a war of choice.2 George H. W. was confronted with an unavoidable crisis when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the president pursued a measured response. George W., on the other hand, sought a crisis with Iraq. Saddam Hussein had no association with the devastating attacks of 9/11, yet George W. chose to invade Iraq under false pretenses of an Iraqi association with Al Qaeda and the belief that Iraq posed a potential future threat, perhaps using weapons of mass destruction. A number of points can be drawn from the analysis of the decisions to engage in these two wars. First, the person in the Office of the Presidency matters; the character and worldview of the president sets the tone and determines the direction of the administration. It is not enough for a president to surround himself with “strong” advisors; strong advisors can mislead the president or “feed” the president’s personal beliefs in order to maintain their positions within the administration. In the case of the first Gulf War, George H. W. had the experience necessary to navigate the murky waters of war. His experience was tempered by advisors who worked well together and confidently expressed beliefs, even those in opposition to the president’s. George H. W’s experience gave him the confidence to listen to opposing views and the knowledge to assess the facts before him. By contrast, George W.’s lack of experience often left him at the mercy of his advisors and, more significant, trapped within his own inflexibility and certainty of thinking. When confronted with an opposing view, he often battened the hatches, refusing to budge. His “my way or the highway ” approach prevented an adequate evaluation of the problem at hand and an exploration of alternatives for dealing with the problem. His father may have been mocked for “prudence” and his lack of the “vision thing,” but the reality is that his measured approach allowed a diplomatic process to unfold. Only when the diplomatic process had reached its conclusion did the elder Bush pursue the use of force. George W. had decided to pursue the use of force before most, if any, alternative options were evaluated. We may want confidence in our presidents; in fact, we may want clear [18.220.187.178] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 08:43 GMT) Comparing the Bush Presidencies 145 direction and vision. However, this can also mean the loss of measured analysis and, in the case of George W., it meant just that. Second, the...

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