Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge

8. A Rendezvous with Eagles, December 24–26 [Contains Image Plates]

8 A Rendezvous with Eagles, December 24–26 At the outside, we thought we could hold off 4 Armd Div until 25 Dec 44. —Gersdorff, chief of staff, Fifth Panzer Armee December 23 was not a productive day for Third Army. While CCB recoiled from the counterattack at Chaumont, the tanks of CCA sat virtually idle the whole day on the south bank of the Sûre River, after having cleared Martelange by 0300 that morning. Corps engineers, assisted by the 24th Engineer C Battalion, could not complete a ninety-foot-long Bailey bridge until approximately 1400.1 Meanwhile, Earnest ordered a company to take the high ground immediately across the river, and the infantry made its way across the blown bridge without opposition. Had the Fallschirmjäger vigorously defended the heights beyond, it is likely that CCA’s advance would have been delayed even longer. With the Bailey bridge finished, TF Oden (35th Tank Battalion) passed through the bridgehead and took the lead. After rapidly overrunning dug-in infantry and antitank gun positions about one mile up the road, CCA was hit again, this time by automatic weapons and antitank fire from Warnach, to the right of the Arlon–Bastogne highway. Warnach was defended by II Abteilung/FJR 15. With the aid of artillery, CCA destroyed four German guns and drove the Fallschirmjäger into the woods, but the Germans infiltrated back into Warnach in the dark. Lieutenant Colonel Hal C. Pattison, CCA’s executive officer, later reflected, “The general impression was that we could just cut our way through” to Bastogne . That impression had proved false on December 23, when CCA and CCB were effectively stalled for the entire day. Prematurely elated by the completion of the bridge at Martelange, Millikin apparently radioed A Rendezvous with Eagles, December 24–26 167 Middleton that 4th Armored Division would contact the 101st Airborne Division that night.2 Paul’s 26th Infantry Division attacked throughout the night but had made no progress by daylight on December 23. The 104th CT held Grosbous , but the commanding officer of the 735th Tank Battalion stated that the infantry “would not go into town ahead of the tanks. Troops of the 104th CT appear very timid and it is necessary for the tanks to do most of the work.” It is not unreasonable to assume that the infantry units of the 26th Infantry Division contained many “empty” uniforms. Although Cole suggested that all the replacements “were steeled, according to the capacity of the individual, to meet a ruthless enemy,” the quick conversion training at Metz could have done little to elevate the fighting power of the division. Perhaps this was why the 328th Infantry apparently told its replacements that “no SS troops or paratroopers will be taken prisoners, but will be shot on sight.” Paul said the same thing: “Under no circumstances will these groups [infiltrating paratroopers] be allowed to return to their lines alive.” Clearly, this order came from Patton and worked its way down. According to Allen, at the 0800 General Staff meeting on December 19, Patton declared that no SS prisoners were to be taken.3 Paul’sotherattackingCT,the328th,wascheckedontheleftatGrevels– Brésil by small elements of the FGB and made little progress during the day. At 1645 Millikin was at the 26th Infantry Division CP telling Paul that his division was lagging behind the others and to push patrols up to the Sûre. Perhaps the report of numerous Tigers, the large number of replacements , and the absence of the 101st CT in corps reserve had made Paul cautious, but Millikin’s direction to hold back the main strength of the 104th and 328th CTs until the situation was better developed ensured a slow advance.4 Patton’s views on holding back one-third of the division are not known, but his general principle was that everyone should attack. On Paul’s right the 318th CT attacked Ettelbruck during the morning of December 23. Ettelbruck was now reinforced by VWB 18 and VAK 406, and the enemy exploited the heights around it with good fields of fire. Elements of the 2nd Battalion/319th CT ran into trouble at Heiderscheid when elements of the FGB drove it back. The Germans quickly withdrew but launched an uncoordinated attack shortly afterward, which the 319th CT destroyed in an hour. While the 318th CT continued to contain Ettelbruck, McBride brought up the 317th CT and passed it through the 318th. The...