Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge

7. Third Army Attacks, December 22–23

7 Third Army Attacks, December 22–23 The amazing Patton said he would be there on time—and he was. —Major General Kenneth Strong The speed with which Patton pulled Third Army out of Lorraine and moved it north unsettled Eisenhower and his staff. Patton noted on December 21, “I received quite a few telephone calls from various higher echelons, expressing solicitude as to my ability to attack successfully with only three divisions.” He declared, “As usual on the verge of action, everyone felt full of doubt except myself. It has always been my unfortunate role to be the ray of sunshine and the backslapper before action, both for those under me and also those over me.”1 At the 1000 SHAEF meeting, Tedder and others questioned whether Patton’s swiftly mounted assault might not turn out to be a piecemeal action, similar to German counterattacks in Normandy. The recorder of the SHAEF meeting, Air Marshal James M. Robb, noted that Eisenhower wanted Bradley to understand that a counterattack for the purpose of holding Bastogne “was to be held in check and not to spread, and that, in fact, it was for the purpose of establishing a firm stepping off point for the main counter offensive. The Supreme Commander mentioned that what he was afraid of was that the impetuous Patton would talk Bradley into allowing him to attack at once with the object of going right through and not awaiting the fully co-ordinated counter offensive.”2 It is clear from Robb’s notes that Patton’s mission was limited in scope and scale and was merely the first phase of Eisenhower’s larger concept of operations. Eisenhower further restricted not only Patton’s freedom of decision but also Bradley’s, by his instructions to the latter. Bradley had to “make absolutely certain of the safety of his right flank in the Trier region from which a new offensive by the German 7th Army still threatened,” 138 Descent on Bastogne and his attack “must” be by phase line, “with all forces held carefully together as to avoid dispersion and waste in strength before Montgomery can join the attack from the north.”3 According to Hansen, Bradley was planning to “conserve strength enough for [a] terrific counter-attack when the German momentum halted.”4 As of 1200 on December 20, Twelfth Army Group’s situation map showed the German 242nd Infantry Division with a question mark immediately behind the 276th and 352nd VGDs, but twenty-four hours later the division and the question mark had disappeared, and no additional divisions were indentified in LXXX Armeekorps. The only panzer division in range according to Twelfth Army Group’s situation maps was the 21st PD, but it was shown moving southeast, away from Walker’s XX Corps.5 This did not match up with Koch’s work map for 0300 December 20, which had the 21st PD stationary behind the 719th and 559th VGDs.6 Moreover, by 0300 on December 21 Koch’s work map was showing the 57th Infantry Division as possibly being in the Saar-Moselle triangle, along with the 416th Infantry Division. This was a new identification, and the question mark remained beside it until December 26. Bletchley Park also sent a message on December 20 reporting that 11th PD had been sent to Fifth Panzer Armee. It would turn out to be inaccurate, but SHAEF and Twenty-First Army Group believed it.7 American doctrine in 1944 identified two types of attack: envelopment and penetration. Both had main efforts, with the greatest possible offensive power concentrated to bring about a decision. Main efforts were conducted on narrow zones with a deep echelon of reserves to secure terrain objectives that facilitated the enemy’s destruction. The objective of a penetration was the “complete rupture of the enemy’s dispositions.”8 Despite Eisenhower’s direction to keep “carefully together,” the reality of the situation meant that Patton could not concentrate his combat power to attack on a narrow front with deep echelons. His new front in Luxembourg was approximately fifty miles; his left flank was entirely open, and he had to anchor his right flank in the Trier sector. Dispersion was inevitable. Indeed, Bastogne may have been designated the main effort in principle, but in reality, Gaffey hardly had more combat power than either Major General Willard S. Paul or McBride, and Allen logically questioned whether Third Army had enough “punch to power-drive them.” Patton...