Kontum: The Battle to Save South Vietnam

11. A New Team for the Defense

11 A New Team for the Defense Anytime the wind is blowing from the north where B-52 strikes are turning the terrain into moonscape, you can tell from the battlefield stench that the strikes are effective. —John Paul Vann speaking about the B-52 strikes around Kontum in May 1972 Tan Canh and Dak To II were now held by the enemy, and the 71st and 95th Border Ranger Defense Battalions at Ben Het, the 90th at Dak Seang, and the 88th at Dak Pek were suddenly behind enemy lines. They could be resupplied only by air.1 Brigadier General John G. Hill Jr., Brigadier General Wear’s replacement, had graduated from West Point in 1946 and had earned the Distinguished Service Cross and the Silver Star in Korea. He was an experienced fighter, and Vann would need a fighter in the battle ahead. Hill was also a qualified army aviator. General Abrams told Hill he would be in command of the US troops, but Vann would be in charge of II Corps. Hill and Vann had known each other for years but were not close friends. They both had been on the staff of a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps summer camp, in the same US Army headquarters in Germany, and in III Corps as advisers to ARVN divisions in 1964–1965. At the beginning of his current tour, Hill had served as deputy commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division, and when the 101st went home, he had been assigned to close down the big American base at Cam Ranh Bay. Hill had that last job virtually running on autopilot by 126 • KONTUM the time Vann asked to have him assigned as his deputy. If Vann had asked Hill if he wanted to work for him, Hill would have said no. But he was not asked, and there was an important battle to be fought and won.2 Brigadier General Hill considered John Paul Vann abrasive and self-centered and saw him run roughshod over people. However, during the six weeks he spent with Vann he realized what a good fighting man he was. Vann never asked his subordinates to do anything he would not do himself, and Hill never knew any officer who got so much loyalty from his troops. Hill had more military experience than Vann but could not equal Vann’s influence with the Vietnamese. Vann was the one American who came, stayed for a decade, and showed the Vietnamese he cared. This feeling and his good rapport with the Vietnamese enabled him to look them in the eye and say things like, “You really screwed that one up!”3 Hill arrived in Pleiku the day after Tan Canh and Dak To II fell. Vann, using his own helicopter, took his new deputy on a guided tour of the battlefield but gave him no specific instructions. During that initial tour and later, there was never any question about their ability to hold Kontum. Hill knew he could not inspire the Vietnamese the way Vann did, but he could get the battle organized. He moved quickly to accomplish three things. His first priority was to get the fire support organized and coordinated. His second priority was to cut the number of men in the DTOC. The G-3 and deputy senior adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Bricker, was a key man, and Hill considered him a “battlewise guy.” However, there were so many excess men in the DTOC that it was difficult for the essential staff members and their advisers to get at their own maps to do their jobs. He cleared the unnecessary staff out of the DTOC. Third and most urgent, Hill needed to develop a system to control all the aircraft already filling the airspace above Kontum.4 The US Army’s Cobra gunships were providing fire support; US Army Hooks were transporting supplies into Kontum and taking refugees out; and slicks were providing C&C ships and tactical airlift for ARVN troops. The USAF FACs were in the air controlling air strikes by USAF, US Navy, and US Marine Corps fighter-bombers. USAF AC-130 Spectre gunships were attacking targets, and USAF C-130s were landing with supplies. VNAF C-123s were landing with supplies and taking out refugees; VNAF A-1s were making tactical air strikes; and VNAF fixed-wing “Spooky” gunships were A...