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10 The Occupation of Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003–2004 Once the Coalition invaded Iraq, the United States expressed its intent to rule directly for a year. It did so first under the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which was set up in mid-April. By mid-May, however, the United States replaced the ORHA with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Lt. Paul Bremer, who immediately implemented two policies that, in retrospect, were extremely problematic. He enforced the de-Ba’thification of government, which took 30,000 experienced administrators out of the political structures of the country. He also disbanded the armed forces, which left 300,000 men—all highly trained and familiar with the Iraqi terrain—unemployed (Tripp, 282). The CPA then set out to establish the institutions of a liberal democracy, which, since weapons of mass destruction were never found, became the legitimizing justification for the invasion. Thus, Bremer and the CPA formed the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in July 2003, and its twenty-five members served in an advisory role to Bremer and his team. Despite the efforts of the CPA—or, as more likely, because of them—an insurgency began, and fighting intensified during its period of direct rule. Some Iraqis fought in order to express their anger at rule by a foreign military power, and popular resentment grew as the country struggled with high unemployment and low access to basic utilities, like electricity. Added to the general angst, there was a struggle to ensure that different parties had access to the future political life of their country as well as the resources that the state distributed. Many Sunnis feared that the United States was privileging Shi’is and Kurds. And some Shi’is feared that the United States was imposing a secular form of democracy. Ethnic and sectarian divisions became more prominent in Iraqi political and social life, therebyunderminingtheliberalreformssoughtbytheUnitedStates.Bythetime theCPAdisbandedandhandedoversovereigntytoIraqinJune2004,afull-scale insurgency had come into being. The Occupation of Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003–2004 / 337 As a result, the fighting between Iraqis and Coalition forces continued and worsened in the first year after the invasion. This Iraq War was not a military engagement in which there was a designated front line and enemy soldiers fought each other. Instead, all of Iraq became a front line, putting this country’s entire population of 26 million at risk. This was true during the actual invasion, and it remained true once the insurgency began. By October 2004, the estimates regarding civilian deaths at the hands of Coalition forces ranged from a conservative 30,000 (proposed by Iraqis and Americans) to 100,000 (Tripp, 295). Civilian deaths are not easy to count. There are not only the casualties resulting from combat and violence; there are also those who die as a result of deteriorating conditions of daily life. A diabetic who dies because he does not have access to insulin is a victim of war. Three years after the war began, CNN reported that 655,000 deaths had occurred, 2.5 percent more than if there had not been a war (accessed 4 October 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/ meast/10/11/iraq.deaths/). This chapter deliberately eschews formal documents in order to focus on the lives and deaths of individual Iraqis under the CPA and during the insurgency. It begins with an Iraqi perspective of the invasion and subsequent occupation based on the author’s work with nongovernmental organizations. The chapter continues with a description by Lt. Paul Bremer on the choice of members for the IGC, which reflects the way the United States perceived Iraqi society. It then moves on to a journal by one young woman in Baghdad who lost her job—and so, her economic independence—due to the war. Anthony Shadid provides insight into one Sunni insurgent who died fighting the occupation. This chapter also addresses Shi’i concerns, particularly after the Ashura bombings of March 2004, which sparked Shi’i resentment because the Coalition proved unable to protect them. In light of the rising insurgency, this chapter also includes the “rules of engagement” for U.S. troops, and these show that children and women were potential targets. This account is then followed by the memoir of a soldier who needed to decide whether or not to kill an Iraqi teenager. Armed Iraqis, however, were not the only victims of fighting. An account by a Marine demonstratesthat innocentcivilianswere alsovictimsofthiswar. Thechapterends with...

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