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10 After Nanking The Nanking Incident provoked no demands from Washington for an immediate punitive response. Nor did it dispel the strong current of sympathy in the American public for the Chinese people. Senator Borah rumbled from Capitol Hill that he was certain the Chinese harbored no hostility toward Americans.1 And President Coolidge, Secretary of State Kellogg, and Secretary of the Navy Wilbur all agreed that the situation in China was not serious. At the same time, Admiral Williams’s needs for ships and Marines would be met.2 Minister MacMurray in Peking, however, was not one to wait patiently. On 29 March, five days after the outrage, MacMurray reported that he and his colleagues, Sir Miles Lampson of Great Britain and Yoshizawa Kenkichi of Japan, recommended to their respective governments that they present Chiang Kai-shek with three demands: first, punishment of the troop commanders and others responsible for the outrage; second, an apology from the Nationalist commander in chief (Chiang Kai-shek) and a promise to refrain from further violence against foreigners ; and third, reparation for personal injuries and material damage suffered by their nationals. Should Chiang Kai-shek fail to provide satisfaction within a certain time limit, the foreign powers reserved the right “to take such action as they consider appropriate .” This statement clearly proposed an ultimatum with the threat of punitive naval action. MacMurray understood that the naval commanders contemplated an attack on the Kiang-yin forts below Nanking. He wanted to hasten the withdrawal of all Americans from Nationalist territories preparatory for a blockade of all ports south of Shanghai. There might still be time to prevent China from becoming “a hostile agent of Soviet Russia,” but the minister warned of the fruits of irresolution : “If this situation is not met, it will mean the downfall of western influence and interests in the Orient.”3 From Consul John Davis at Nanking came corroboration that “conciliation heretofore followed toward the Nationalist Government has failed.” He also warned, “Each day’s delay is rendering the eventual solution more difficult.”4 Unwilling to be rushed and probably looking to the Navy for counsels of moderation, Kellogg responded to MacMurray that the State and Navy departments wanted to consult Admiral Williams for his suggestions “as to some of the difficulties involved.” Specifically , Washington feared that Americans still in the danger zone might be endangered by hasty action, that it was not yet clear whether Chiang Kai-shek was strong enough to control the Nationalists, and that if an ultimatum were served, the governments concerned might be compelled toward further action or reprisal should the demands not be met. The State Department expressed “grave doubt” as to the advisability of an ultimatum but agreed that some formal demand for apology and reparation was necessary. In response to his appeal for Army soldiers from the Philippines , MacMurray was informed that fifteen hundred Marines would proceed from the West Coast of the United States to Shanghai.5 After Nanking / 141 Counsels of moderation from Tokyo buttressed the doubts in Washington. The Japanese foreign minister, Baron Shidehara Kijuro, was well known for his policy of conciliation toward China. Shidehara reported that from his own sources he had concluded that radicals among the Cantonese who hoped thereby to discredit Chiang Kai-shek had actually perpetrated the Nanking outrage. Shidehara held that, unless forced into an embarrassing position by the demands of the powers, Chiang would be both willing and able to restore order. Japan, Shidehara told American ambassador Charles MacVeagh, did not want to send troops to China. Instead, Japan favored relying for protection of foreigners in China on naval vessels and upon such forces as were ordinarily carried by those vessels. Shidehara would leave the solution of any problems arising from the Nationalist captures of Shanghai and Nanking to the Chinese themselves, while always reserving the right later to demand an apology and indemnification for damages.6 MacMurray was appalled by Washington’s delay. Yoshizawa, for Japan, had approved the minister’s proposed terms provided no time limit for acceptance was stated. Lampson, for Britain, indicated that London was going beyond the minister’s proposals by consulting its military and naval experts to determine what they proposed for adoption by the five principal naval powers. The French and Italians also agreed to joint action. Only the United States, to MacMurray’s obvious horror, had failed to act in a manner that in his view would prevent further escalation of dangers to Americans...

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