Nonstate Actors in Intrastate Conflicts

6. Turkey, the Kurds, and Turkey’s Incursions into Iraq: The Effects of Securitization and Desecuritization Processes

C h a p t e r 6 Turkey, the Kurds, and Turkey’s Incursions into Iraq: The Effects of Securitization and Desecuritization Processes Gallia M. Lindenstrauss During the last three decades, Turkey has repeatedly sent its forces across the border into Iraq, largely as a result of the trans-state nature of the Kurdish problem and the weakening control of the Iraqi central government over developments in Northern Iraq. The most recent of these incursions took place in 2011, previous interventions occurring in 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2008.1 These frequent Turkish attacks have received wide international criticism, especially from EU countries (Hale 2007: 76). Furthermore, these offensive operations seem contrary to Turkey’s strategic culture as a status quo power, one that would normally hesitate before taking action across its borders (Benli Altunışık 2007: 69). In this chapter, I explain this recurring phenomenon and address variations in Turkey’s inclination to use this strategy. Although some of these incursions occurred during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988),2 I will focus on the post-Cold War era, as the dramatic changes that have taken place during this period deserve special consideration. To explain Turkey’s choice of military actions vis-à-vis the Kurds in Northern Iraq (specifically, the PKK fighters who sought shelter there), I first briefly present existing arguments on the causes of military interventions, and then, with reference to these findings, turn to consider theories of securitization and desecuritization. Shifting to the question of Turkey’s behavior, I present the origins and evolution of the 126 Gallia M. Lindenstrauss “Kurdish problem” within Turkey itself and discuss some of the interstate and transnational developments in the last two decades that have affected Turkish actions. Last, I link the intrastate, interstate, and transnational dimensions and show how the securitization and partial desecuritization of the Kurdish issue in Turkey has influenced this state’s inclination to militarily intervene in Iraq. Military Interventions, Securitization, and Desecuritization It is debatable whether Turkey’s military actions in Iraq are “military interventions ” according to common definitions of the term.3 Although Turkey is concerned with and opposed to the possible separatist aspirations of Iraq’s Kurdish community, it has refrained from taking sides in the internal struggle in Iraq during its incursions. Also, the frequency of Turkey’s actions renders the claim that these operations are not part of the “normal” relations between the two states, at least in the last three decades, problematic. Moreover, Turkey has maintained a small force of around 2,000 men on Iraqi territory for long periods of time (Benli Altunışık 2007: 79; McGregor 2007: 4); hence, the Turkish presence in Iraq might be more appropriately referred to as Turkey’s “security zone” or “sphere of influence” in Iraq. The fact that Turkey has sent large forces to Iraq only for short incursions, however, does not fit with such terminology. These problems of definition notwithstanding, the literature on military interventions in other countries’ intrastate conflicts is still useful as a starting point for explaining Turkey’s actions in Iraq. Regan (1998: 754) suggests that this literature can be divided into two main types. The first emphasizes instrumental considerations and rationalist risk-value calculations with regard to the state’s national interests.4 The second type emphasizes affective considerations and kinship (Carment and James 1996: 528–30; Ganguly 1998: 9–33). Most studies that emphasize instrumental considerations concentrate on the motives that lead great or super powers to intervene (Jesse and Simon 2004: 37). Some studies, however, consider the motives of regional powers and small states (Khosla 1999: 1143). A superpower will decide to intervene out of considerations of strategic balance of power and diplomatic, economic, and military interests. Regional states will intervene mainly as a result of regional considerations, such as border disputes and relative regional influence Turkey, the Kurds, and Incursions into Iraq 127 (Pearson and Baumann 1974: 277). These states may fear that an internal conflict in a neighboring state will lead to the creation of a power vacuum that other states may exploit to their advantage (Walt 1996: 19, 44). A military intervention in these circumstances would thus be aimed at preventing the opponent from gaining strength, or a counter-intervention may occur after another actor has already intervened. Studies that emphasize affective considerations highlight factors such as national, ethnic, ideological, and religious kinship. The importance of such affinities can be...