Moral Minority: The Evangelical Left in an Age of Conservatism

10. Identity Politics and a Fragmenting Coalition

CHAPTER 10 Identity Politics and a Fragmenting Coalition Last year’s meeting was focused; we wrote the Declaration. This year everyone was doing his or her own thing. —James Skillen, founding member of the Center for Public Justice As Watergate erupted in the hot summer months of 1974, so did evangelical politics. The ferment began when Ron Sider, the Anabaptist organizer of the 1973 pan-evangelical Thanksgiving Workshop, tried to address the complaint most registered by delegates who had been in Chicago: that the Declaration , lacking specificity, resembled the bureaucratic pronouncements of mainline Protestants and so, like them, could be safely ignored. For the much larger second Workshop, held one year later in November 1974, Sider organized six caucuses—on evangelism, evangelical feminism, politics, education, evangelical nonviolence, and race—so that the 134 delegates could produce “action proposals.” On the surface, the new approach succeeded. Eight of the nine action proposals passed unanimously, among them initiatives to establish a Center for Biblical Social Concern, inaugurate a forum for dealing with white racism, endorse the Equal Rights Amendment, plan fifteen regional conferences in major cities across the United States, and continue discussions about evangelical nonviolent direct action and global hunger. Caucuses appointed individuals to implement each of the proposals within twelve months. The continued momentum seemed to confirm Sider’s confidence that “a new movement of biblical social concern is afoot in this land.” 188 Chapter 10 The reality was more complicated. Sider’s “buckshot approach,” as one observer described the eight action proposals, had “misfired” in unintended ways. The caucus approach divided delegates by interest—blacks to the race caucus, women to the gender caucus, Anabaptists to the economic lifestyles and nonviolence caucuses, Calvinists to the politics and education caucuses. When members of each caucus finally introduced their proposals to the larger Workshop, fireworks resulted over idiosyncratic and inordinately specific suggestions. Moreover, the caucus protocol undercut individual investment in the overall vision. As political philosopher Jim Skillen complained, “Each person had only to vote his or her support of a proposal with the intent that such a project could be one legitimate mode of action for ‘someone’ to take (not necessarily the voter).” Delegates dutifully ratified most proposals in a process engineered to create consensus. Yet the unanimous votes hid sharp disagreements. One delegate noted, “Last year’s meeting was focused; we wrote the Declaration. This year everyone was doing his or her own thing.” If the 1974 Workshop exposed profound disagreements, the 1975 Workshop completely splintered as battles over identity raged. Many black participants continued to bemoan white insensitivity. Many women condemned persistent sexist attitudes and language. Those accused—mostly white men— complained of persecution themselves. “While I am deeply committed to the elimination of prejudice and intolerance, and certainly aware of the need for the elimination of sexism,” wrote Ira Gallaway, pastor of a United Methodist congregation in Fort Worth, Texas, “it is not my opinion that unrealistic quotas or groveling guilt supply the answer. . . . I think that we all should participate as equal human beings and not in the role of continued castigation and suspicion of each other.” To pacify female and African-American delegates, organizers implemented a quota system to fill the planning committee . White men caucused to select four white men; women chose four women; and black participants added eight to the committee. Despite the emergency measure, the contentious Workshop broke up a day early. Indiana State University history professor Richard Pierard confided to a fellow delegate , “I don’t know if the workshops will continue after the way this last one went.” Pierard’s prediction was correct; the 1975 Workshop was the last. The consensus of 1973, built around anti-Nixon sentiment more than shared language or political philosophy, proved surprisingly ephemeral. The fragmentation of the Workshop points to the powerful effects of identity politics. Many historians, pointing to the new salience of sexual, racial, gender identities that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, contend that Identity Politics and Fragmenting Coalition 189 identity politics stunted the agenda of the larger political left and impoverished political and social discourse. These scholars argue that liberal culture requires some basis of commonality, that the particularism of identity celebrates differences to the point that it distracts from shared social commitments . Others point to the flowering of multiculturalism and gains in civil rights for minorities brought about by the new emphasis on rights and identity. For good...