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Chapter 10 The Struggle for Kirkuk Problems of Process Article 140 was drafted to resolve a complex problem—the future status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories—and its failure does nothing to eliminate the original problem. If a viable solution is to be found to a problem of immense significance to Iraq, it is important to understand why article 140 was apparently incapable of providing this. The interaction of multiple factors contributed to the failure of article 140, among them the sheer legal and logistical complexity of the process, the growing strength of opposition to 140 at the federal level, the diminishing political influence of the Kurdish parties, and, arguably, a flawed strategy on the part of Kurdish leaders. The decisive factor, however, was the wording of the article. This suggests, in turn, that article 140 is not the appropriate vehicle for the Kurds to accomplish their goals. The Legal and Logistical Complexities of Article 140 On paper, the provisions of article 140 seemed straightforward: those deported or expelled by the previous regime were to be restored to their homes and property; those individuals ‘‘newly introduced to specific regions’’ were to be resettled back to their places of origin with land and money in compensation; and a remedy was to be found for the unjust manipulation of governorate boundaries by the former regime. Collectively , these provisions constituted the ‘‘normalization’’ stage of the 140 process, and the completion of this stage was required prior to a permanent resolution ‘‘of disputed territories, including Kirkuk.’’ Leaving aside for the moment the difficulties associated with the subsequent two stages and the fact that these terms applied not just to Kirkuk but to all disputed territories (however defined), the implementation of just the first stage in the process raised technical and logistical complexities that 168 Future of Kirkuk would have taxed the most efficient of bureaucratic structures. Of the four elements involved in the process—the return of the (mainly Kurdish ) deported, the resettlement of the (mainly Shi’i Arab) ‘‘newly introduced ,’’ the resolution of property claims, and the restoration of Kirkuk’s pre-Ba’thist administrative boundaries—Kurdish authorities had significant control over only the first of these. The return of deported Kurds began almost as soon as Kirkuk fell to coalition forces. The majority of returning Kurds did not have homes to return to in the city, and so the issue of property disputes did not arise. In the former Kurdish towns and villages outside the city, this was also not a significant problem because in most cases the resettled Arabs had already left before the arrival of former Kurdish residents. The logistical issues associated with the influx of tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of Kurds concerned the provision of basic necessities such as housing , electricity, medical care, and access to an adequate sewage system. In turn, this required a major overhaul of Kirkuk’s already dilapidated infrastructure, and the finances for this were never made available by the US or Iraqi government. The inadequacy of the budgets allocated to Kirkuk by the federal government meant that the only meaningful improvements to the governorate’s infrastructure were bankrolled by the KRG, via the two Kurdish parties, and latterly by the US under the Provincial Reconstruction Team program. Despite these difficulties associated with the return of displaced Kurds, however, in terms of completing the normalization stage of article 140, they presented few problems administratively. The Kurdish parties controlled the relevant directorates in the governorate and were, therefore, able to allocate land to returning Kurds who needed it, while most of those returning were coming from Kurdish-controlled governorates, thus minimizing problems with the transfer of documentation. The fate of the so-called wafideen presented an altogether more formidable logistical challenge. In the first instance, it was necessary to distinguish different categories of wafideen. Many had been resettled in neighborhoods specially constructed by the former regime to facilitate the city’s Arabization, others had directly displaced the original residents , and still others owned property that had changed hands multiple times since the deportation of the original owner. There was also the controversial question of whether wafideen would be forced to leave or their departure was voluntary. The compensation for those opting to leave required a political decision to determine the amount of compensation , which was not endorsed until March 2007, and the allocation of the requisite funds for this purpose...

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