Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis

KUHN AND HIS CRITICS: THE COMMON GROUND

61 Science, Rationality, and Incommensurability fundamental level, this assumption is just what Kuhn is calling into question. This point has been concisely expressed and generalized by Richard Rorty when he seeks to root out the bias "that all contributions to a given discourse are commensurable" and shows how fundamental this bias has been not only for the philosophy of science but for modern epistemology. By "commensurable" I mean able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict. These rules tell us how to construct an ideal situation, in which all residual disagreements will be seen to be "noncognitive" or merely verbal, or else merely temporarycapable of being resolved by doing something further. What matters is that there should be agreement about what would have to be done if a resolution were to be achieved.34 Rorty claims that this has been the fundamental bias of epistemology since Descartes. One of the reasons why this bias has been so entrenched is that it has been taken to be the essential characteristic of "scientific method." Kuhn's work can be seen as challenging the claim that this assumption is fundamental for scientific activity. Or, to put it more cautiously, while Kuhn thinks that such an assumption is warranted and necessary for normal science, it does not apply at times of scientific crises. To give up such an assumption about commensurability is not to call into question the rationality of science but rather to change our understanding of the character of rationality in scientific disputes and conflicts-an understanding that highlights the practical character of scientific rationality. In this respect, then, Kuhn (although at times still caught in the language of "objectivism " and "relativism") seeks to move beyond this Either/Or. KUHN AND HIS CRITICS: THE COMMON GROUND I want to return to showing how much common ground there is between Kuhn and his critics. Consider Paul Feyerabend, who has been the enfant terrible in the postempiricist philosophy of science. Any interpretation of Feyerabend is fraught with dangers, because he not only delights in his own inconsistencies but also warns the reader against taking his arguments "seriously." In Against Method, he teases us by saying he hopes the reader will remember him "as a 62 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism flippant Dadaist and not as a serious anarchist."3s Feyerabend relishes the extremism of his shifting positions and thoroughly enjoys mocking and knocking down any claim to stability, fixity, or "puritanical seriousness." I do not want to claim to be representing his "true beliefs."36 (It is not even clear what this means.) But I do find a persistent theme or voice in his work (especially in Against Method) that is relevant to our discussion. Although Feyerabend might deplore the fact, there is an underlying thematic coherence in the style and content of his claims. Given Feyerabend's own assessment of what is happening not only in the philosophy of science but in society itself-that we are threatened by closure, fixed method, and social rigidity, all of which are enemies of life, spontaneity, creativity, imagination, and individual freedom-then the task of the critic is to use any rhetorical means available to undermine and ridicule those who think that there are or ought to be fixed rational criteria in scientific inquiry (or any other domain of life). In the spirit of the "opportunisticII strategy that he employs, Feyerabend informs us that "there may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else. I do not think that we are living in such a time today" (p. 22). But although ostensibly, rationality is the great enemy for Feyerabend , especially as it is employed by those whom he calls "critical rationalists," some of his other comments reveal a very different attitude: "We are here dealing with a situation that must be analysed and understood if we want to adopt a more reasonable attitude towards the issue between 'reason' and 'irrationality' than is found in the school philosophies of today" (italics added, p. 154). Despite the exuberance of Feyerabend's style and the self-conscious outrageousness of some of his claims, he has an eminently serious and important purpose. Although he wants to claim much more, one of his...