Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines

6. Subcontracted Violence in the Philippines 1986–1992: Excusing Violations

6 Subcontracted Violence in the Philippines 1986–1992: Excusing Violations When President Corazon Aquino, the widow of slain popular opposition figure Benigno Aquino, assumed power in the Philippines in February , human rights advocates had a field day. Their political struggles for human rights and their personal pain and sacrifices were finally worthwhile. The high public visibility of human rights concerns and the mobilization of other states and organizations during the Marcos era had come to a happy end. Within weeks after Aquino’s inauguration as president, the human rights situation would improve significantly. Aquino and respected members of the human rights community in her cabinet epitomized the Philippine government’s human rights commitment. Jose Diokno, founding father of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), became the chairman of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights, established in  as a forum for individual complaints . Aquino appointed Rene Saguisag, a lawyer active in the human rights organization, MABINI, as secretary of state. With these committed individuals involved, her cabinet began to take it for granted that international human rights instruments would be ratified. They no longer generated internal debate. Saguisag said, “We tried to carry out all commitments. Otherwise, we would have lost our credibility. . . . I think that it did not even lead into a debate because we were all so philosophically committed to supporting any human rights initiatives” (Interview with Rene Saguisag, Manila, April , ). Within the next few months and years, international human rights standards would be incorporated into the domestic legal structure. An interim freedom constitution granted Filipinos all civil and political rights and Aquino extraordinary presidential powers. Thus, she had both executive and 172 Chapter 6 legislative power. Within a year, the freedom constitution was ratified by a popular plebiscite (Rüland : –). Within three years, her administration ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (); the First Optional Protocol (), making it possible for individuals to file complaints to the Human Rights Committee; and the International Convention against Torture and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. In , the government created an independent permanent agency to deal with individual complaints on human rights violations, the Constitutional Commission on Human Rights. In sum, Aquino’s government did the rational thing for a transitional regime, according to liberal theories in international politics . It linked up with an international human rights regime and locked its incipient democratic structures into international regimes to guarantee it would not fall back into authoritarian governing (Moravcsik ). Even more important, human rights provisions were incorporated into the domestic legal structure. The administration restored legal guarantees such as habeas corpus and supported a more independent judiciary. In addition , the newly ratified constitution outlawed torture and all forms of secret and incommunicado detentions, protected citizens from random searches and seizures, and called for the dismantling of the private armies and paramilitary units established during the last years of Marcos’ rule (Green : f; Rüland : ). In sum, the mobilization for human rights under Marcos immediately translated into concrete actions to implement domestic legal human rights laws. International human rights organizations were pleased. Amnesty International and the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights concluded that, despite isolated abuses, the military was profoundly improving its human rights record. Serious abuses, characteristic of the armed forces during Marcos’ final years, had become the rare exception (Amnesty International c: ; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights : x). According to Amnesty International, “The Aquino Government’s commitment to the protection of human rights and the establishment of legal safeguards” had “led to major improvements” (Amnesty International c: ). But this picture would not remain so rosy. The next two years,  and , saw the emergence of some  armed private bands, collectively called “vigilantes” and ostensibly organized against a rising tide of communist guerilla insurgency. Late in January , the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), the region’s principal federation of civil right watchdog groups, sharply criticized the Philippine government for “serious and unjustifiable” violations Violence in the Philippines 173 of human rights. AHRC particularly cited alleged abuses by governmentsupported , anti-communist vigilante groups operating throughout the country. These groups were creating the impression of a widening militarization that was “turning the whole of the Philippines into a battlefield” and was “pitting civilian against civilian” in a war that properly should be fought by military forces (Asian Human Rights Commission ; van der Kroef : ). Other human rights organizations voiced similar concerns. In March , Amnesty International observed that “a pattern of widespread human rights violations...