Human Rights and State Security: Indonesia and the Philippines

3. Indonesia’s New Order 1965–1978: Transnational Advocacy and State Security under Military-Led Modernization

3 Indonesia’s New Order 1965–1978: Transnational Advocacy and State Security under Military-Led Modernization In , the policy planning staff at the United States State Department prepared a study on the role of the military in underdeveloped areas. It argued that American policy had to change. Instead of emphasizing civilian supremacy over the armed forces and an optimistic perspective on the prospects for democratic, parliamentary development, the new focus was military modernization. The planning staff called for a more coherent American doctrine with an emphasis on encouraging patterns of economic development “in which the military see themselves as deeply involved in the process of modernization but in a role as cooperative partnership with civil authorities and instilling a concept of ‘total security’ in which soldiers view themselves as insurance against both external invasion and internal subversion” (Simpson : –). The study reflected ongoing discussion among American policy makers and academics in think tanks and newly created social science departments at American universities. All were reconsidering the general role the military could play in modernization processes in developing countries. The army was one of “the more modernized of the authoritative agencies of government in transitional societies,” and it could act as a “modernizing agent” or a “modernizing force for the whole of society” (Pye : ). The military was antiauthoritarian. Its technical education and its orientation toward standards of efficiency made it a source of stability. A youth would be taken away from his kinship and local community as “individualityinhibiting ” forces (Shils : ). In a similar vein, Lucian Pye argued that 54 Chapter 3 the military represented the most rational organization in transitional countries and it was the only “effectively organized element capable of competing for political power and formulating public policy.” In addition, according the army an outstanding role would add to international stability. He concluded, “The military can make a major contribution to strengthening essentially administrative functions” (Pye : , ). Within the new paradigm of military-led modernization, Indonesia would become a showcase. It would receive program assistance backed by millions of American dollars that aimed to involve the military in national development and counterinsurgency operations. Western political commitment to military-led development went far beyond the mere struggle against Communism in the developing world. As Bradley J. Simpson shows in detail, the military moment linked military aid tightly to comprehensive programs of economic and technical assistance and “framed the boundaries of American and Indonesian thinking about possible paths to the country’s future” (Simpson : ). The commitment extended the American policy, begun in , of condemning and working to annihilate the Communist movement in Indonesia. And it would significantly shape what planners could or could not imagine as alternatives to military-led modernization when transnational networks of human rights organizations questioned the political legitimacy of the Suharto government in an international campaign dedicated to political prisoners and East Timor in the mid-s. In this chapter, I trace the influence that transnational non-governmental activities had in promoting human rights in Indonesia in the s, a process set against these military developments. In examining the emergence, growth, and limitations of an international solidarity movement that both supported political prisoners in Indonesia and opposed the Indonesian military’s invasion of East Timor, I show how international human rights organizations challenged the human rights practices and political authority of Indonesia’s Suharto government. This chapter provides the first crucial test for my argument that these transnational human rights networks and the public dialogue over the rights of political prisoners and the invasion of East Timor affected the government’s position on both issues. At the same time, I show that the content of these public debates matters. Against the backdrop of substantial political challenges to the Suharto government, rulers found an effective justification, political Islam. And as this justification resonated among international audiences and connected to world polity norms, it changed the outcome of the transnational mobilization for Indonesia’s New Order 1965–1978 55 human rights. Empirically, I focus on two instances of transnational mobilization for human rights that have rarely attracted the attention of human rights scholars: the political prisoner campaign against the Suharto government and the self-determination campaign in East Timor in the s. In both cases, transnational activities met with only limited success. Both campaigns occurred at the same time, and their interaction could have increased international human rights pressures on the Indonesian government . A human rights campaign by Amnesty International...