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Chapter 11 Global Citizenship and Human Rights: From Muslims in Europe to European Muslims My objective in this chapter is to link two enlightened and humane ideas of our time, human rights and citizenship, in order to invite scholars, opinion leaders, and the general public to explore how the synergy and mutual support of these two concepts can contribute to protecting human dignity and social justice at home and abroad. The main premise of my argument is that the universality of human rights assumes, or presupposes, the possibility of “global citizenship” as the basis of the entitlement to rights and the ability to enforce them. Despite their different antecedents in the intellectual and political histories of various societies, the concepts of citizenship and fundamental rights have also been joined in mutual support and synergy in the development of the human rights paradigm. Accordingly, my thesis proposes that the idea of global citizenship as the basis of the universality of human rights not only can clarify the meaning and implications of national citizenship but can also support human rights claims by noncitizens. Since human rights are due to all human beings by virtue of their humanity, enjoyment of these rights should not be limited to the citizens of the state where a person happens to be. Moreover, while rethinking citizenship at the conceptual level as simultaneously national and global, the proposed approach is also supported at the pragmatic level by the present historical moment. At present, there is an increasing convergence of opinion and developments around the basic idea of global citizenship as a complement to national citizenship—despite disagreement regarding precise definitions, feasibility, and strategies for realizing that shared vision. There are also sound policy reasons for the proposed approach, such as the dependency of European economies on migrant labor From Muslims in Europe to European Muslims 273 and consequent need for their social accommodation—including provision of education, health and other services—which can be appreciated without reference to human rights principles as such. This approach, however, does not mean abolishing all legal and political distinctions between citizens and noncitizens of a state, which are indeed necessary and justified from a human rights point of view.1 It is already established that the universality of human rights requires certain minimum standards in the treatment of noncitizens by the authorities of the state, regardless of their legal status. That is, the idea of universality guarantees human rights to every person, everywhere all the time, whatever his or her status may be, whether he or she is in a country legally or illegally, lawfully subject to deportation or not. That does not eliminate the need to consider the rationale and implications of distinctions among citizens and noncitizens, as well as among different categories of noncitizens, in relation to particular claims of rights. But such determinations should not be based on broad categories of civil and political rights versus economic, social, and cultural rights, because that is neither an accurate classification—since each right can contain both elements—nor can granting or denying each right be justified in relation to all groups of persons. In other words, each right should be considered in relation to each group of claimants, instead of lumping together different rights or groups of claimants. For example, human rights such as protection against torture or inhuman degrading treatment or punishment and the requirement of fair trial and due process of law must be secured on a universal basis. In contrast, the right to vote or be elected to public office are clearly due only to citizens, though limited voting rights may be accorded to long-term residents of a country or municipality in proportion to their contribution to the well-being of the community. It is also possible to justify a higher level of entitlement to education, health services, and employment opportunities for citizens than it is for noncitizens; a lower level of some of these benefits for permanent residents; and none for transient visitors to a country who do not pay taxes or fulfill other obligations of citizenship or legal residence. While such questions should clearly be considered in relation to specific claims and individual conditions of claimants, my plea is that this should be done with due regard to the underlying rationale of universality of human rights, which does not exclude other valid and relevant factors in determining policy. Moreover, I am suggesting that the linkage of universality of human rights and global citizenship should facilitate...

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