The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Human Rights

9. Enforcing Civil Liberties

Chapter 9 Enforcing Civil Liberties The 1989 Erasmus Prize for Human Rights is awarded to the International Commission of Jurists ... because the ICJ contributes to promoting and protecting human rights where these are in grave jeopardy through the delegation of research missions and publication of findings; because the quality and the objectivity of the ICJ is beyond all doubt, ... -From November 21,1989 award presentation Righteous anger erupts when tyrants murder for power, soldiers gun down protesters, torturers maim children, death squads terrorize peasants, and racists subjugate their equals. Victimized students, workers , lawyers, and religious leaders, their families, friends, churches, and unions appealed in desperation for IC] help. Speaking truth to power became a defining mission, a moral cause. In rescuing prisoners tortured by sadistic officials of whatever ideology, the IC] categorically rejected partisan political goals. Inspired by moral outrage, IC] activists invoked nonpolitical principles of universal justice. Human life and dignity have so much more value than financial gain that IC] advocates resent comparison with political interest groups. Yet atrocities result from struggles for power which the IC] confronted with political skill and legal expertise. South American military juntas secured their power against threats real and imagined with unimaginable torture devices. The IC] countered with quiet diplomacy, public protest, and lobbying for sanctions. Complaints to the United Nations challenged semiofficial death squads in Central 188 Chapter 9 America and mass murders by African tyrants. Fact-finding missions produced embarrassing reports about Iran's secret police, repression in Sri Lanka, martial law in the Philippines, mass detention in Indonesia , and racial injustice throughout Southern Africa. A Cold War neutral, the IC] faulted both Eastern repression in the USSR, Romania , and Czechoslovakia and Western abuses in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Northern Ireland. Political dissidents and rival governments used the IC]'s principled efforts for partisan advantage. To assist individuals arbitrarily detained or unjustly condemned, MacDermot made interventions by letter, cable, telephone, or in person with presidents, ministers, and diplomats. As freedom waned in the 1970s, cries for help greatly exceeded the capacity of four IC] legal officers to respond effectively. Governments occasionally released a detainee represented by the IC], but most complaints arose from systematic abuses beyond a single NGO's influence. MacDermot used the IC] network to activate other NGOs, regional and U.N. agencies, and national officials responsible for human rights. The three sections below illustrate and evaluate IC] tactics to (1) aid individual victims, (2) publicize gross violations, and (3) activate international protection procedures. Casework for Individual Victims In the United States, public legal aid offices assist the indigent in civil disputes with merchants, landlords, and government agencies. Public defenders represent detainees awaiting criminal trial and the condemned facing execution. Ie] casework for individuals has similar ends but very different means. The "clients" are political prisoners held without trial, torture victims, death row inmates, citizens denied permission to emigrate, or dissidents forced into exile. Their cases reach Geneva from local ICJ members and affiliates, the press, churches, family members, other NGOs, or a concerned government official. Journalists, students, labor leaders, church workers, lawyers, and ICJ members detained by local authorities have required an international public defender. In twenty years, the ICJ has made nearly six hundred interventions in more than one hundred countries.' Over three-fourths involved third world governments, with roughly equal numbers from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. As other NGOs became active, the average number of IeJ interventions declined from thirty-eight a year in the early 1970s to twenty-two in the late 1980s. Compared with Amnesty Enforcing Civil Liberties 189 International, the ICJ had a very small case load and relied more on private interventions than on public pressure. Quiet Diplomacy As the first line of defense, MacDermot personally contacted a government official-the president, prime minister, attorney general, foreign minister, or U.N. ambassador. Foreign ministers and ambassadors sensitive to international pressure were generally more cooperative than justice ministers. MacDermot became thoroughly acquainted with diplomats in Geneva. Some who disagreed with their own governments provided information off the record and pressed other departments to respond. When MacDermot personally knew the head of state, he went directly to the top. In diplomatically worded cables, letters, and phone calls, the Secretary-General made humanitarian appeals for clemency or requested information about reported detainees . Responding to summary executions, MacDermot's blunt telephone rebukes berated officials for their "uncivilized" response to political...