Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus

7. A Marxian Approach to Human Rights

Richard NordM 7. A Marxian Approach to Human Rights Introduction Marx often scorned "rights talk" and other "nonsensical" normative chatter about fairness, freedom, justice, duty, and so forth. Such remarks should not be taken to mean that Marx was opposed in principle to normative evaluation, including the conception of universal human rights. In fact, concern for human rights underlies Marx's whole project, his criticisms of past and present societies and his vision of the future communist society. He condemned the capitalist system for what many would now call gross violations of fundamental human rights, the miserable living conditions of the workers, their subjection to capitalist tyranny in thefactory , and brutal state suppression of working-class protests. The purpose of this chapter is to outline, in broad terms, a Marxian approach to human rights. The focus is on the task of establishing an international standard of human rights and applying this standard to particular societies. For various reasons, Marx did not take up this task himself; his work does not contain a developed theory of human rights. The Marxian position I describe is formulated from principal elements in Marx's philosophy and political and economic sociology. In my interpretation I stress those elements in Marx's complex and not always consistent thought that have the most to offer on questions of human rights.1 Given these key elements, I asked myself, what would be the Marxian position on the human rights questions discussed herein? The rationale for this essay is to see what can be learned from the Marxian theoretical tradition. Contrary to what many would contend, I argue that it docs make sense from the Marxian perspective to try to construct an international standard of human rights, a standard that can be used to evaluate all A Marxian Approach to Human Rights 163 societies, and thus societies of very different types. The particular sociohistorical features of a specific society would determine how the universal standard is applied to the society. The concrete human rights for a specific society would have their grounding in abstract universalrights and in the particular features of the society in question. In my discussion of the standard and its application, characteristic features of a Marxian approach to human rights arc described—for example, the focus on human needs, the conception of the human as a social being, the importance attached to class and economic factors in the analysis of society, the stress on economic rights, and the belief in collective rights, such as the right to economic development. In the course of the discussion I distinguish between this Marxian approach to human rights and some of the specific answers at which Marx himself arrives regarding certain questions, such as those concerning economic development. One could reject or amend some of these specific answers, for empirical or ethical reasons, and still adhere to the Marxian approach presented in this chapter, thereby ending up with a stronger commitment to immediate human rights. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to reflect on historical developments since Marx's time, including the experiences of the so-called Marxist states, for their relevance to a Marxian theory of human rights. Instead, this essay is concerned with identifying and clarifying the theoretical elements in Marx's work that could provide the basis for a Marxian theory of human rights. The elaboration of the theory, and the argument for its validity and usefulness, would of course require dealing with historical developments since Marx's time (as well as the history of previous periods ). At certain points in this chapter I do indicate examples of empirical work that will be needed for the development of an adequate Marxian theory of human rights. Marx's Criticism of "Ideological" Commentary Some discussion of Marx's criticism of "ideological" normative discourse is useful in helping to understand the distinctive Marxian approach to human rights.2 Marx's often expressed scorn for moral commentary reflected in part what he believed to be the indeterminate and essentially meaningless nature of much of it. Vague and general terms like liberty, freedom, justice, and fair distribution are often bandied about or used as political weapons without a clear indication of what they mean. (The erro- 164 Richard Nordahl ncous assumption is that the words contain their meaning in themselves.) In the "Critique of the Gotha Program" Marx criticizessocialists for using the vague phrase, "a fair distribution of...