Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology

Notes

357 Notes Chapter 1 1. In most introductions to Husserl’s philosophy the natural attitude is treated as a mere transitional phase to describe the phenomenological reduction (see Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1989, 58ff.). I know of no work on Husserl that explicitly devotes a chapter or section to it. Waldenfels in his study dwells on the proper right (Eigenrecht) of the natural attitude, but he, too, fails to give a thorough description of it (see Waldenfels 1971, 67ff.). 2. “Die Aufgabe einer ‘Ontologie der Lebenswelt.’ ” Not only is the task of this ontology only feasible by going back into the natural attitude, but also the founding of all scientific and philosophical efforts on the ground of the relativity of the lifeworld can be seen as a recognition of the natural attitude as an “Ur-Dóxa” that can never be uplifted or bracketed. 3. Fink, however, sees as the central operative concepts the notions of “phenomenon ,” “epoché,” “constitution,” “achievement” (Leistung), and “transcendental logic” (phenomenological language) (see Fink 1976, 203), himself presupposing the natural attitude as the basis for the issues he raises. Hence it can be said that to Fink himself the natural attitude remains as an operative concept overshadowed by these aforementioned notions. Moreover, one might suspect that Fink’s analysis of the phenomenological predication in §10 of the SixthCartesian Meditation (Hua-Dok II/1) implicitly bears a definition of the language of the natural attitude. Likewise does his notion of a phenomenological transcendental idealism as a dialectical relation between natural and phenomenologizing attitudes (see ibid., §12, 170ff.). However, this “definition” could only ex negativo be derived from the positive definition of the attitude of the phenomenologizing Ego. In other words, the natural attitude, to Fink, only becomes crucial in the enworlding of the transcendental “truths” into the natural attitude in the “transcendental pedagogical-implications” of phenomenology. For a comparison between Husserl’s and Fink’s views of transcendental phenomenology, see Luft (2002). 4. “Die beiden Titel: ‘transzendentale Einstellung’ und ‘natürliche Einstellung ’ sind grundsätzlich transzendentale Begriffe” (Hua-Dok II/2, 104). See also Fink (1966, 113). 5. See esp. the Fifth Logical Investigation (Hua XIX/1): “Über intentionale Erlebnisse und ihre ‘Inhalte’” (“On intentional lived-experiences and their ‘contents’”). 358 N O T E S T O P A G E S 4 0 – 4 1 6. I use the term “life” here in order to imply all kinds of human action, not only conscious, that is, mental acts, but also all human activity, down to physical life on the level of mere instincts which Husserl tries to grasp under the title “Triebintentionalität” (intentionality of drives [see Hua XV, no. 34, 593ff. and app. XLIII, 597ff.]). Since I employ this concept of intentionality as a mere basic framework for the phenomenon of attitude, it is not necessary to go into this issue of intentionality more deeply. 7. Husserl himself is not blind to these pragmatical interests, as is often insinuated. To him, these pragmatical usages are a matter of the relative being as opposed to its limit of absolute, optimal appearance, which interests the philosopher . For Husserl, the relative being comes at the very end of the account of the constitution, whereas to Heidegger, it is the próteron pròs hemâs (see Hua XI, 23–24). “Das thematische Interesse, das in Wahrnehmungen sich auslebt, ist in unserem wissenschaftlichen Leben von praktischen Interessen geleitet, und das beruhigt sich, wenn gewisse für das jeweilige Interesse optimale Erscheinungen gewonnen sind, in denen das Ding so viel von seinem letzten Selbst zeigt, als dieses praktische Interesse fordert. Oder vielmehr es zeichnet sich als praktisches Interesse ein relatives Selbst vor: Das, was praktisch genügt, gilt als das Selbst. So ist das Haus selbst und in seinem wahren Sein, und zwar hinsichtlich seiner puren körperlichen Dinglichkeit, sehr bald optimal gegeben, also vollkommen erfahren von dem, der es als Käufer oder Verkäufer betrachtet. Für den Physiker und Chemiker erschiene solche Erfahrungsweise völlig oberflächlich und vom wahren Sein noch himmelfern.” For Husserl’s relation to and reading of Heidegger , compare chapter 5 of the present volume. 8. The intermediate dimension between purely passive givenness and active interest is called attention. Compared with other phenomena described in great detail (such as perception), Husserl devotes fairly little space to this phenomenon . See Hua XXXVIII (which was not published at the time this text was originally composed), where Husserl describes this phenomenon at some length. 9...