Hunting Nazis in Franco's Spain

3. Neutrality, Postwar Politics, and the Diplomacy of Repatriation

70 3 neutrality, postwar politics, and the diplomacy of repatriation Whatever the considerations for transitional justice in Europe, punishment of criminals, investigations of spoilers, and so on, at the end of the day neutrals were very different from the defeated or even collaborationist states. They were not occupied by the Allies; they did not have new or restored governments. The practical implementation of these legal changes thus required the cooperation of neutral states like Spain. Repatriation, if carried out, was not going to be imposed, but negotiated. As the U.S. and British governments used intelligence to put together a detailed diplomatic press, Spain inevitably was forced to play along and carry out some of the policies the Allies demanded regardless of Spain’s own legal view of the responsibilities (or lack thereof) concerning wartime neutrality. However, in acknowledging the precarious position of Spain in postwar Europe, the Franco regime did not simply fall down in the face of Allied demands. The ongoing negotiations concerning the repatriation of obnoxious Germans reveals as much about Spain’s fairly aggressive foreign policy as it does about the Allied desire to extend denazification beyond Germany’s borders. While the Allied embassies and consulates developed on-the-ground policy based on broad ideas of denazification and their knowledge of Nazi Germany’s extensive networks in Spain, the Spanish government responded with its own ideas about neutrality and about what, if anything, it owed the international community. the spanish response The Spanish government took very limited action in 1944 to respond to Allied concerns about wolfram smuggling and about German 71 Neutrality, Postwar Politics, and the Diplomacy of Repatriation agents with the May 1944 agreement, internment, and some expulsions . This action was expanded upon as the war came to a close. Knowledge of the repatriation policy being developed in occupied Germany coincided with Spanish efforts to demonstrate their commitment to carry out their 1944 promises to deport Nazi agents. Spain dramatically increased the number of suspect Germans interned , with some 200 internees at the high-profile civilian internment camp in Caldas de Malavella, by June 1945; by November Spain had interned a total of 1,150 Germans, which the Spanish government deemed an appropriate response to Allied demands. Indeed, many of the most prominent Nazi agents and diplomatic officials were held in the camp in Caldas de Malavella for most of the second half of 1945. These individuals were joined throughout the initial postwar period by many other Nazis who had entered Spain clandestinely , including those who feared prosecution for war crimes. It would be incorrect to compare Caldas de Malavella to prisonerof -war or other internment camps established across Europe during World War II or even to camps in Spain meant to hold refugees, most notably the one at Miranda del Ebro. Caldas de Malavella was (and is) a spa town not far from the city of Girona in Catalonia. German internees were sent there to live in the hotels and resorts and were not permitted to leave. These hotels, working through the civil governor of Gerona, billed the Spanish government for the room and board provided. Given their living arrangements and freedom of movement within the town, it can hardly be called a camp. Indeed, the British embassy protested the “laxity of the conditions” there, writing that there was “no effective restriction whatever” on contact with the outside world, which, given the individuals being held there on suspicion of espionage, made no sense. A similar protest from the U.S. embassy in late 1944 elicited a response from officials at the Interior Ministry, which was responsible for the camp, that measures had been taken to prevent those present from “carrying out all activities which led to their internment” in the first place. Many within the Foreign Ministry argued that since these individuals were separated from their families, many of whom were Spanish-born, Hunting Nazis in Franco’s Spain 72 and prohibited from making a living, they were actually victims at Caldas and that Spanish internment was a “moral and humanitarian problem” as much as it was a judicial one. Spain’s aggressive internment policy was short-lived. The number of agents held at the camp, all from the top-priority lists provided by the Allies, went from 32 in November 1944 to 53 in August 1945 and 70 that November but had...