Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff

VI. McClellan, Pope, and Second Bull Run

CHAPTER SIX McCLELLAN, POPE, AND SECOND BULL RUN here was reason, indeed, for Lincoln to urge the western commander to Washington to assume his anomalously elevated position. McClellan was on the James River, within a few miles of Richmond, moaning that he was greatly outnumbered ; Pope was south of Manassas Junction with his newly formed Army of Virginia; General Robert E. Lee, with the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, was between them. Halleck was horrified ; Jomini's first principle was concentration on important points. This situation resulted from the fumbling organization and incoherent system of the Eastern command. Without the benefit of a philosophy of military affairs, whether Jomini or other, the Eastern leaders had improvised. Halleck had applied the Jomini principles, modifying them only as the exigencies of the situation demanded, and emerged with success in the West. In the East the situation had steadily deteriorated; Old Brains prepared to apply Jomini. Once again Halleck was expected to bring order to chaos. That meant eliminating the division between Pope's and McClellan's armies —one of the generals must abandon his position and transport his forces to the other commander. McClellan was closer to Richmond , and the popular cry to capture that city—essentially the layman's expression of a "places" theory of war—was strong. However , Halleck was displeased with McClellan's position. He was operating on exterior lines, anathema to the theorist of Jomini's T McClellan, Pope, and Second Bull Rim 65 school. His line of approach to Richmond was indirect rather than direct, and supplying McClellan's army appeared to be hazardous and difficult. Halleck could hardly ignore Lincoln's attitude when he decided which army to move. The President, under the Constitution, was commander in chief of the armed forces of the nation, and Lincoln was prepared to use his vested powers. He had the ability to dominate and control men, or change their opinions by persuasion. If both of those methods failed, he would force his subordinates to take unpopular actions for which they, not he, would be damned. Throughout the war, Lincoln would use Halleck. Confusion with regard to the powers and responsibilities of a general-in-chief made his task easier. Army regulations did not define his sphere of activity . Previous American military practice did not furnish a precedent . Washington, Dearborn, and Scott, who had been "generalsin -chief" during the country's former wars, never expostulated a theory of command and had seldom exercised their powers outside of the limits of the immediate army they commanded. During the early stages of the Civil War, when Scott and McClellan served as generals-in-chief, an identical situation prevailed. Thus Lincoln could decide for himself what Halleck could or could not do. Halleck's services to Lincoln were invaluable. He gave the President technical advice, translated Lincoln's civilian terms into military parlance for field generals, and assumed almost all the administrative details of running the army. Politically Old Brains served Lincoln well. When the President decided to fire a general he had Halleck sign the order; thus the general's supporters blamed Halleck for the dismissal. Lincoln liked to assume a pose of weakness and simplicity and to give the impression that others were controlling him. When friends inquired about a military move, Lincoln would say, "I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck," or "You must call on General Halleck, who commands."1 1 T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, 142—44; Easier (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, V, 399. 66 Henry Wager Halleck But Halleck was not always a tool in Lincoln's hands. Old Brains fought for the principles he had imbibed from Mahan or Jomini, and often dissuaded the President from impractical military operations . Many of these theories Halleck modified as the war progressed , but one which he never abandoned soon became the guiding principle of the Union armies—concentration on vital points. And in the end it was the taking of a place, Vicksburg, that sealed the doom of the Confederacy. Halleck's handling of the problem posed by the division between McClellan and Pope indicated the course he would follow in the future. McClellan's solution was simple—send more troops to the James. Pope's advice was just as short—send McClellan's men to Manassas. Lincoln had worked hard but without notable success as both...