Aristotle's "Best Regime": Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law

6. The Political Excellence of the Many: A Reexamination of Politics 3.9–13

6 the political excellence of the many: a reexamination of politics 3.9–13 It can be argued that contemporary political theories of democracy tend to either exaggerate the political capacities and virtues of the average person1 or argue that the political apathy and selfishness of the average person preserve democratic regimes.2 In recent decades, proponents of these tendencies have turned to Aristotle’s understanding of democracy for justification of their various interpretations of democracy. But can Aristotle be used to defend or to support democracy? He can indeed, as this chapter demonstrates; not only does Aristotle support democracy but he makes the suggestion that democracy may legitimately be understood as the best regime (see Narcy 1993; Aubenque 1993b; de Romilly 1975, 66–71 and 122–5). The role that Aristotle’s political thought offers to democratic theory is interesting as well as controversial. Some scholars have argued that Aristotle’s understanding of human beings as political animals supports a radical participatory democracy (see Arendt 1958, Beiner 1983, Sullivan 1984; contrast Winthrop 1978a, 1978b). But this view of Aristotle is at odds with the traditional view, which understands that he condemns democracy as a deviant, or a defective , regime type (see Bartlett 1994a, 1994b; Coby 1986, 1988; Finley 1985; Johnson 1988; Lord 1987, 1981, 1982; Lockyer 1988; Mulgan 1977, 1991; Winthrop 1978a, 1978b). Also, other scholars find either of the aforementioned views of democracy too exaggerated for the evidence given by the surviving and prospering democratic regimes (see Mueller 1992a, 1992b). It is the argument of this chapter that Aristotle, in his Politics, supports a middle ground 1. Examples of scholars holding this view are Arendt 1958, Barber 1984, Beiner 1983, Euben 1993, and Farrar 1988. 2. Examples of scholars holding this view are Dahl 1956 and 1971, Huntington 1981, and Michels 1962. the political excellence of the many 123 for the democratic regime.3 Not only does the view of democracy Aristotle presents develop a middle ground, it also understands that, given human nature , the democratic regime is superior to all other regime types. To discover this reading of Aristotle, one must turn to Politics 3.9–13. Politics 3.9–13 deals with arguments that the rule of the many has a valid claim as the best regime or, as the text says, as the most choiceworthy regime for polises. The statement made at the beginning of Politics 3.11, that the multitude should be the authoritative element (3.11.1281a39–40), is what Aristotle finally holds to be the truth concerning the best regime (contrast Bookman 1992; Lindsay 1992a, 1992b). It can be argued that Politics 3.9–13 is a consistent whole, dealing first with the debate between democracy and oligarchy and later with all the other valid claims to rule. Certainly both the rule of the many and the concern for justice are constant themes in these chapters (see Wolff 1988, 1993). Let us begin our examination of this section, which will lead us to the first peak—the rule of the many as the best claim to rule—in Politics 3.9. oligarchy and democracy Politics 3.9 opens thus: It is necessary first to grasp what they speak of as the defining principle of oligarchy and democracy and what justice is [from] both oligarchic and democratic [points of view]. (3.9.1280a6–9) This seems to be asking two questions: What is said to be the defining principle of democracy and oligarchy? and What is held to be just by democrats and oligarchs? The first question asks how common opinion defines these two regimes. To put this question another way, how do most people define democracy and oligarchy? The simple answer is the one given above in Politics 3.8: oligarchy is the rule of the rich and democracy is the rule of the poor (see Farrar 1988, Finley 1985). The second question addresses a wholly separate issue: What does each type of regime—particularly democracy and oligarchy—hold to be just? This 3. There are several interpreters of Aristotle’s Politics who also advocate a middle-ground position on democracy but at the same time advocate a liberal democratic understanding (e.g., Galston 1991; Nussbaum 1988, 1990a, and 1992; Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991; Salkever 1991; and Swanson 1992). This chapter attempts neither to address nor to refute those who advocate a liberal or libertarian Aristotle. [18.217.116.183] Project MUSE (2024-04-26...