The Arkansas Rockefeller

III: The First Victory

CHAPTER III The First Victory o>ckefeller—having garnered more than twice as many votes as any Republican had previously—was not embarrassed by his 1964 defeat. He was looking forward to 1966 and a chance to take on the old master again. He would win; he could feel it in his bones. But there was an enemy out there more formidable even than Orval Faubus—an enemy that would hinder Rockefeller in just about any of the things he wanted to accomplish . It was disinterest, inertia. It plagued the electorate like nothing Rockefeller had seen before, and all his finger-stabbing speeches about his dream of an indignant public throwing rascals out of office and raising hell about bad government were not getting folks stirred up. In late 1965 the public's favorable and unfavorable ratings ofRockefeller were essentially unchanged from those of the previous year. Those unchanged ratings had to be disappointing, what with Rockefeller preparing for another campaign against Faubus. As a matter offact, for all of WR's preaching about Faubus' shortcomings, the incumbent governor had enjoyed a small but significant increase in favorable ratings. But despite these discouraging reports, Rockefeller was determined to run against, and this time defeat, Orval Faubus. Faubus—with 71 percent favorable November, 1965, ratings—would be the man to beat, Rockefeller and most of his aides believed. Faubus appeared to be the first choice of the people as the best Democratic candidate to face Rockefeller. The second choice was Senator John L. McClellan. Jim Johnson didn't show. R 52 The Arkansas Rockefeller The survey of opinion in late 1965 confirmed once more a depressing fact. The Republican party still wasn't growing —not at all. The 11 percent was precisely the same as in 1961. Something else would have to be done, if the percentage was to be upped at all. However, with the breakdown of yellow-dog Democrat votingpatterns, Rockefeller could win without a majority ofhardcore Republicans. The objective, no matter how privately distasteful to loyal Republicans , was to woo Democrats and Independents without driving away the Republicans already in the fold. More than 60 percent of the people felt the Republican party had gained strength (even though it hadn't) and that this augured well for the GOP. This change in public opinion seemed to increase the social acceptability of individuals identifying themselves as Republicans. But did it? No such acceptability was evident in the growth in party ranks. Three issues were most on the minds of the people of Arkansas.1 Assuming that the people voted for candidates on the basis of issues, it seemed critically important to define the public's desires exactly and to map plans for satisfying those desires. Education was the primary issue. Roads and highways were the second-most important category. And the third was employment. Most voters thought that education ought to be improved, with vocational education and senior high schools leading the list in educational concerns. There was also, of course, substantial support for improvement of all public schools and for the introduction ofpublic kindergartens. Specific areas for educational improvement included better pay for teachers, more schoolrooms, free textbooks, and better curricula. The only problem with all these areas of progress urged by the people was a correspondingly strong feeling that not another cent of taxes should be exacted from them. The obvious paradox here may have escaped the people, but it didn't get past Rockefeller. As an honest man, he could The First Victory 53 never see—even when his aides repeatedly explained it to him—how a man could stump the state promising the improvements the public desired without telling them how he proposed to pay for these improvements. WRwould, in spite of contrary advice, propose tax increases and bond issues to finance needed improvements. And even though the people never enthusiastically supported him in these revenue-producing programs, he did break down some of their resistance by constantly showing them the hypocrisy of candidates promising services without proposing any means for funding them. WR's successor would benefit from his courageous talk of taxes and bond issues. By late 1965, the polls indicated that people thought it would be a bad idea for Faubus to seek a seventh term— partly because they felt fourteen years was too long for anyone to be governor and partly because they felt Faubus' "political machine" needed breaking...