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169 9 P resident Nixon celebrated the new year with a long, detailed interview with CBS television reporter Dan Rather. After answering a number of questions about Vietnam, Nixon discussed his impending trip to Beijing. Dismissing speculation that the visit was politically motivated, Nixon said that the process had taken a couple of years because he wanted a substantive, not “cosmetic,” meeting. “I can assure you,” he said, “it wasn’t delayed because I was thinking ‘Well, if I could just have it done before the New Hampshire primary in the year 1972—what a coup.’” While politics were important, “the country comes first.” Conceding the “basic philosophical differences” between the United States and China, Nixon nevertheless contended that “talks about those differences” would help prevent war. Asked about Taiwan, Nixon promised that recognition of the PRC “in the conventional sense” would not result from his visit because the United States still recognized the GRC and planned to uphold the 1954 treaty. Nations that did not have “conventional,” diplomatic relations could still have relations such as communication, trade, and the like. He also assured Rather that “no deals” had been made by Kissinger in Beijing regarding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan. In early January, Haig traveled to Beijing for a final pre-summit meeting with Zhou in order to “make certain that the physical arrangements for the President ’s trip were appropriate, so as to avert any possible embarrassment to either side and also tie up a few diplomatic loose ends.” The Chinese, Haig recalled, “chose to treat our presence as a dress rehearsal for Nixon’s visit, with me as stand-in,” and the Chinese gave him an “exceptionally cordial” reception at the airport. Haig was very impressed not only by his hosts’ hospitality, which he attributed to the atmosphere Kissinger had created HOMESTRETCH TO THE BEIJING SUMMIT 170 a cold war turning point during his visits, but also by the “serious and dedicated way” in which the Chinese had resolved to set down the summit’s technical details. Their receptiveness had encouraged him to believe that Beijing had “crossed [the] line on normalization” and wanted “to proceed at almost any cost.” Ji Pengfei, however, subjected Haig to a “propagandistic pitch about the difference between our two systems” during a welcoming banquet. The situation seemed like a diplomatic game of good cop, bad cop, and a test of Haig’s diplomatic mettle, as Ji Pengfei “questioned our ability to be able to work with a socialist system.” Haig bristled at these remarks and “put him down rather abruptly” and this seemed to work. Ji Pengfei ultimately read a “warmly written toast” and the banquet turned out to be a success. Just as Haig prepared to go to sleep, Zhou summoned him. Arriving at the Great Hall of the People around midnight, Zhou and an entourage of about six people, including Tang Wangsheng, greeted the general. The Chinese immediately offered numerous toasts of maotai, “a fiery brandy said to be 180 proof, or 90 percent alcohol.” After the Chinese took turns draining their glasses, Haig said that “the visitor was supposed to empty his glass with every toast and turn it upside down on top of his head to show sincerity.” He somehow managed to avoid “this custom but still found the toasts an ordeal,” and got down to business. He began by giving “in blunt terms, a soldier’s assessments of recent events in South Asia” so the two sides could “discuss them in the context of the President’s visit.” Haig explained that its “recent steps” during the South Asian war, in particular Kissinger’s threat to cancel the president’s visit to Moscow, had convinced the Soviets to pressure India to accept a ceasefire. After “careful” study of Soviet intentions in Asia, the administration had concluded that Moscow wanted to “encircle the PRC with unfriendly states” and had determined that the “future viability of the PRC was a matter of our own national interest.” Turning to the Vietnam War, Haig explained why the United States had launched a “retaliatory” air campaign over North Vietnam, a decision that had been taken “with the greatest reluctance.” He called Hanoi’s refusal to respond to the administration’s October 11 proposals, and its recent attacks on U.S. forces from its Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries, an attempt to “humiliate the United States—a humiliation that no great power can accept.” Hanoi’s...

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