Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight against Civil Rights, 1938-1965

5. Victory through Compromise

5. Victory through Compromise on 9 september 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower signed House Resolution 6127 into law, an event marking the enactment of the first civil rights bill since Reconstruction. This noteworthy occurrence received limited media attention because, the previous week, Arkansas governor Orval Faubus had activated the National Guard, ostensibly to prevent violence following the federal court ordered desegregation of Little Rock Central High School. Although Faubus’s actions prevented a violent clash at the commencement of fall classes, the Guardsmen’s presence strained the administration’s patience because they also hindered the enforcement of the court’s order. After several failed attempts at reconciliation with the obdurate governor, Eisenhower sent in troops from the 101st Airborne and federalized the National Guard to force compliance with the desegregation order. The presence of federal troops in the South evoked parallels to Reconstruction and prompted widespread condemnation from segregationists. President Eisenhower’s actions particularly surprised southern senators. During the civil rights debate earlier that year, the caucus succeeded in removing Title III from Resolution 6127 to prevent just such a use of force. At the time they did not fully recognize that the president already possessed the power to quiet domestic unrest through military action and that Eisenhower was prepared to use it.1 1. For a sampling of the literature dealing with Little Rock, see Adams, Firsthand Report, 351–359; Melba Beals, White Is a State of Mind: A Memoir (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1999); Branch, Parting the Waters, 222–224; Robert Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984); Ernest Q. Campbell, Christians in Racial Crisis: A Study of the Little Rock Ministry (Washington, D.C.: Public A≠airs Press, 192 delaying the dream Following the Little Rock imbroglio, Richard Russell sent a blistering telegram to the president. In it, he condemned Eisenhower’s “highanded and illegal methods” and speculated that the administration intended to “intimidate and overawe all the people of the country who are opposed to the mixing of races by force.” When describing the incident to constituents, the Georgian labeled Eisenhower’s tactics as “totalitarian” and “Hitler-like,” stating that the president relied on “the American version of Storm Troopers” against “defenseless civilians.” Far from achieving any positive end, Eisenhower’s actions , according to Russell, not only set back southern race relations but also undermined national unity at the height of the Cold War.2 Harry Byrd, Virginia’s champion of massive resistance, joined Russell in condemning the Little Rock episode. Rather than breaking the will of the South, Byrd speculated that Little Rock would “intensify existing bitterness, and will strengthen the resistance of the southern people to enforced integration .” By the end of 1957 the Virginian’s conviction had grown that the push for civil rights would “mellow” since he did not think “the President or anyone else realized the intense opposition on the part of the South until recent months.” National outrage over the “invasion” of Little Rock, the unexpected strength of the southern fight against desegregation, and the Republican Party’s failure to win over black voters despite its recent support for civil rights legislation would, Byrd believed, produce a slackening in the political pressure against the South. Massive resistance once more appeared to o≠er the promise of success. If the South continued demonstrating its fierce 1959); Tony Allen Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984); John A. Kirk, Redefining the Color Line: Black Activism in Little Rock Arkansas, 1940–1970 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002); Michael J. Klarman, “How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,” Journal of American History 81 (June 1994): 81–118; George R. Metcalf, From Little Rock to Boston: The History of School Desegregation (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983); Reed, Faubus; Irving J. Spitzberg Jr., Racial Politics in Little Rock, 1954–1964 (New York: Garland, 1987). 2. RR to Dwight Eisenhower, 26 September 1957, Box 133, Folder 6, Russell MSS (“highhanded ”) and (“intimidate . . .”); RR to Kenneth Westling, 26 September 1957, Box 133, Folder 6, Russell MSS (“totalitarian”); RR to Henry Kuizengg, 2 October 1957, Box 133, Folder 1, Russell MSS (“defenseless . . .”); RR to Zack D. Carvery, 4 October 1957, Box 133, Folder 1, Russell MSS (“the American version . . .”); RR to Zack D. Carvery, 4 October 1957, Box 133, Folder 1, Russell MSS; RR to Henry Kuizengg, 2 October 1957, Box 133, Folder 1, Russell MSS (“Hitler-like”); RR to Ken...