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168 8 Religious Rivalry and Cultural Policymaking in Lebanon under the French Mandate jennifer m. dueck In 1929 the newly chosen Lebanese prime minister, Émile Eddé, initiated an ambitious agenda of reforms. This ill-fated program soon toppled his government and provoked demonstrations not only in Lebanon but also in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. The spark that ignited the uproar pertained to schools: Eddé closed one hundred state schools allegedly in order to improve the quality of teaching. This move was seen throughout the region as an anti-Muslim offensive by a Christian prime minister, and after his government’s demise seventy-five of the closed schools were subsequently reopened.1 Crucially, although the popular demonstrations were primarily Muslim, the political opposition that ultimately led to Eddé’s resignation over the issue was conducted by his Christian Maronite rival, Bishara al-Khuri, who capitalized on Muslim discontent. If demonstrators in the street were divided by religious affiliation, the political leaders were motivated by personal ambition and rivalry to find allies from across the sectarian spectrum. As a colored block on the French mental map of empire, the Levant conjures up just such images of interconfessional power brokering, often heavily tinged by the influence of French Catholic missionaries. Although short-lived relative to French rule in other imperial territories, the French presence in Syria and Lebanon between 1920 and 1946 aptly illustrates the conflicted nature of imperial policymaking and of the colo- Religious Rivalry and Cultural Policymaking in Lebanon 169 nial mind-sets behind it, which were shaped by an unstable constellation of metropolitan, Levantine, and international considerations. Lebanon’s symbolic status in the French administrative mind owed much to its large proportion of Catholics, who historically benefited from French care and protection. This informal protectorate emerged through official arrangements , such as the Capitulations signed by the French government with the Ottoman Porte in 1569 and 1604, as well as through private enterprises carried out by French Catholic missionary societies. However, this privileged relationship with one demographic group hampered French relations with other communities, notably Muslim ones, whose members felt marginalized and disenfranchised under mandate rule. In illuminating how these dynamics evolved over the course of the mandate, education serves as a useful lens. This is not only because the educational arena reveals how the close ties between French administrators and local Catholics operated in practice, but also because it demonstrates the tensions and inconsistencies that emerged in relations between French government officials and local communities. For example , did disputes over educational provision follow a similar pattern as negotiations over other issues, or can we see a divergence in the pattern of debates over education, as compared to debates on other political challenges? Whichever the case, what differentiated the French mandate administration’s political and educational agendas from the agendas of the many nongovernmental bodies providing education for Lebanese students? In finding some answers to these questions, it is helpful to trace the relationships between the French government and the various French educators, as well as the relationships between these French parties and the Lebanese Catholic and Muslim educational bodies. Inevitably, this requires close observation of French official thinking—of colonial minds at work. Particular emphasis is placed on the interplay of relationships between the French Catholic missionaries, the Maronite Patriarchy, and the Muslim urban bourgeoisie. Finally, the picture is rounded out by looking at the interconfessional negotiations over Lebanese education that came in the early years of Lebanese independence. The Colonial Mind: Officials and Educators Before beginning, it is worth making a few preliminary comments on French rule in mandate Lebanon. The French colonial mind can be [3.133.147.252] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 18:10 GMT) Language, Culture, Communities of the Colonial Mind 170 broken down into several broad categories. Although we certainly find divergent opinions within these groups and overlap between them, they can nevertheless serve as useful markers. On the government level, French policy was decided largely between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris and the High Commission in Beirut. Educational policy in particular fell under the jurisdiction of the Service des œuvres at the Quai d’Orsay in Paris and its branch office under Beirut’s High Commission. In this milieu staunch secular republicans rubbed shoulders with fervent Catholics who saw the Levant as a haven for French Catholicism after the anticlerical laws of the early twentieth century. On the nongovernmental level, there was...

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