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  Johnston’s Railroad Strategy As discussed in chapter , Johnston began, in late May, seriously to urge that Forrest’s cavalry be sent from Mississippi to operate against Sherman’s railroad line of supply. To be effective, as Johnston told Senator Hill on July , such a raid would have to break the railroad south of Dalton to cut the Yankees off from their advanced base. For the rest of his life Johnston believed passionately that such a ploy would have produced Sherman’s defeat and vindicated his own conduct of the campaign. Since Davis refused to commit Forrest against Sherman’s rail line, he—and certainly not Johnston—bore responsibility for the advance of the Yankees deep into Georgia, the loss of Atlanta, and eventual Confederate defeat. Ever since the war, Johnston’s numerous disciples have reiterated this mantra with a conviction that puts to shame the faith of a monk who burns himself to death for a cause. An evaluation of Johnston’s proposed strategy requires answers to three separate but related questions. First, could the Southerners have cut the railroad between Dalton and Sherman’s army group? Second, if so, which force—Forrest’s horsemen from Mississippi or Wheeler’s with Johnston’s army in Georgia—was better situated to have done so? Third, had the rail line been severed, would the outcome of the campaign have been changed? The answer to the first question is a clear “maybe” and necessitates a consideration of the second. Could Forrest have wrecked Sherman’s railroad as Johnston and his apologists have so confidently asserted? Could he even have reached the tracks? If Forrest were at, say, Tupelo, Mississippi, he would have had to Johnston’s Railroad Strategy  have marched directly east  miles to reach the  in North Georgia . (This distance makes no allowance for any meanderings his column would have to make because of bends in the road, mountains, rivers, or other natural obstacles.) Such a march almost certainly could not have been concealed from Yankee scouts and spies in northern Mississippi and Alabama. Once the Federals spotted the marching column, they would know its destination and purpose. On such a march eastward Forrest’s left flank would have been vulnerable to any Union force that might strike south from the Tennessee River valley against it. Should Forrest make it across North Alabama, where should (or could) he reach the railroad? From Chattanooga to Dalton, Sherman had two rail lines (the  through Ringgold and Tunnel Hill and the route east to Cleveland, Tennessee, thence south to Dalton). Destroying only one of them would inconvenience Sherman but would not force him to give up his advance into Georgia. It, doubtless, was for that reason that Johnston specified attacking the rail line south of Dalton. From Dalton to the Oostanaula, however, the looming height of Rocky Face Ridge shielded the railroad against a raid from the west. Should Forrest somehow reach the tracks east of the ridge, he ran a high risk of being penned there and cut off from Mississippi. If Forrest approached Sherman’s rail line to the south of Rocky Face Ridge, he would run into the fortified and garrisoned town of Rome. He could not storm the town (which had rail and telegraphic communication both to Sherman’s army group and to Chattanooga). Besides, any assault on Rome risked a defeat or a pyrrhic victory that would delay him and cost the Rebels more than they could possibly gain. Forrest would have to bypass Rome, veering southeast up the left bank of the Etowah or northeast up the right bank of the Oostanaula. Should Forrest choose the former course, he would have to cross the Coosa to reach the Etowah. His route would then take him dangerously close to the rear of Sherman’s army group because of the railroad’s bend to the east at Kingston, and he risked being trapped against the Etowah and the Coosa. Even should he reach the railroad in that area, he certainly could not linger because troops would pour northward from Sherman’s force to drive him off. If Forrest went up the Oostanaula and crossed that river at some ford, he probably could get to the railroad, but he would be in great danger of being trapped in the angle formed by the Etowah and the Oostanaula Rivers with the Rome garrison to the west, a division of Federal cavalry [18.117.137.64] Project MUSE (2024-04...

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